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I. INTRODUCTION
Modem criminal jurisprudence is experiencing a "crisis of self-
definition." 1 In recent times, retributive theory has been a central force
underlying our criminal justice system. Society expects criminals to be held
"responsible" for their crimes, garnering proportionate sentences that
correspond directly to the depravity of a particular offense. Through
retributivist ideology, the social order is preserved, as potential criminals are
deterred from engaging in future unlawful conduct. However, as
retributivism confronts increasing challenges from countervailing theories,
the foundations of our modem criminal jurisprudence are being called into
question. Specifically, the doctrine of rehabilitation continues to emerge as
an attractive alternative for adjudicating "crimes of addiction" such as non-
violent drug abuse and alcohol-related offenses. In these settings, where
treatment is imperative, it seems implausible to refer these offenders to a
criminal justice system that emphasizes penological instead of rehabilitative
objectives. Consequently, the adjudication of crimes of addiction in the
criminal courts represents a misguided approach because it fails to
effectively treat the addictions that ignite criminal acts, leaving offenders in a
position to repeat offenses once incarceration terminates.
This is the point at which our criminal court system, with its emphasis on
retributivist jurisprudence, is particularly vulnerable, and where alternative
dispute resolution (ADR) mechanisms, such as court-sponsored mediation,
emerge as a tenable alternative. The most efficacious method to deal with
crimes of addiction is to refer offenders to institutions that can successfully
serve a rehabilitative, not retributive, function. Because of their informal and
congenial paradigm, specific ADR mechanisms, such as drug courts and
* The author would like to thank Professor Douglas Berman for his assistaince in
refining this Note. I also want to extend a personal thank you to Marjorie for her
unwavering support and encouragement over the previous year and throughout the Note
writing process.
I Book Note, Rehabilitating Theories of Punishment, 104 HARV. L. REv. 1126
(1991) (reviewing DAVID GARLAND, PUNISHMENT AND MODERN SOCIETY (1990))
(examining the ability of the penal system to address contemporary problems in society
and studying philosophical approaches as a means of evaluating the role of punishment in
the criminal system).
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court-sponsored mediation, can successfully implement the former approach,
and thus more appropriately and effectively adjudicate crimes of addiction.
These mechanisms are better suited to deal with these offenses because their
informal structure allows them to address the insidious addiction that lies at
the core of these criminal acts. In this way, mediation can serve as an
effective means for resurrecting rehabilitative ends that address an
individual's addiction, thereby leading offenders onto a path of recovery. In
doing so, mediation can converge with the criminal law in vindicating both
society's and the victim's interest in eradicating the problem of addiction.
Part II of this Note surveys the retributivist model, examining the criminal
courts' role in endorsing retributive theory as a central force behind its
jurisprudence. Part IlI illustrates how adjudication of crimes of addiction in
the retributivist-minded criminal court system has failed, and how the formal
structure of the criminal courts would prevent implementation of alternative
solutions such as rehabilitation. Part IV examines the rehabilitative model
and studies the successful application of rehabilitation in the drug courts, a
novel alternative dispute resolution mechanism. Part V concludes that, based
on the success of the drug courts, rehabilitation is the proper and most
effective end to pursue in fashioning a successful solution for crimes of
addiction. Mediation, because of its informal and non-adversarial paradigm,
can be a successful means to implement the rehabilitative ideal by playing a
successful role in the adjudication of crimes of addiction.
H. THE APPROACH OF THE CRIMINAL COURTS:
THE RETRIBUTIVIST MODEL
Retributivist theory is a driving ideological force behind our criminal
justice system.2 Retributivist thought strives to sustain "a moral justification
for the practice of punishing [criminal behavior]. ' '3 Generally, retributivists
justify punishment on two grounds. First, punishment exists to provide "just
deserts" for criminal offenders.4 Second, retributivist theory advocates
punishment only to the extent that it directly corresponds with the depravity
2 Developments in the Law-Alternative Punishments: Resistance and Inroads, 111
HARV. L. REv. 1967, 1970-71 (1998) [hereinafter Alternative Punishments].
3 David Dolinko, Three Mistakes of Retributivism, 39 UCLA L. REv. 1623, 1626
(1992). Dolinko questions the underlying justifications for retributivism concluding that
retributivism suffers from several flaws that necessitate a re-examination of its
application. Id.
4 Id. at 1627-29 (criticizing the "just desserts" rationale underlying retributivism).
Dolinko argues that the mere fact that-criminals deserve to suffer is not sufficient to
justify inflicting such suffering upon them.
[Vol. 16:2 2001]
REACHING ACROSS LEGAL BOUNDARIES
of the moral act.5 In this way, criminal punishment manifests itself in a
proportional manner.6 This Part examines the justifications underlying
retributivism, followed by a discussion of the role retributivism plays in the
criminal jurisprudence of the United States.
A. Retributivism and "Just Deserts"
Retributivism advocates punishment of the criminal offender.7 The
retributivist model views punishment as a moral good per se, as an effective
response to the morally depraved actions of the individual. 8 While alternative
theories employ forward-looking approaches, 9 retributivism is backward-
looking, maintaining that punishment exists as its own good. 10 Retributivism
does not justify its existence on the basis of contingently beneficial effects
that may accrue to society." Instead, it views punishment as an intrinsically
worthy response to the previous transgressions of the individual. 12 In
essence, punishment, as a moral matter, is permissible because it represents
what the criminal offender deserves. 13 This notion derives its justification
from the idea that the individual has the capacity to make volitional choices.
These choices and the ensuing moral depravity serve as the principal
justification for imposing punishment. 14
5 Id. at 1636-42.
6 Id. at 1636.
7 Id. at 1626.
8 See, e.g., Herbert Morris, Professor Murphy on Liberalism and Retributivism, 37
ARiz. L. REv. 95 (1995).
9 R.A. Duff, Penal Communications: Recent Work in the Philosophy of Punishment,
in 20 CRIME AND JUSTICE: A REviEw OF RESEARCH 1, 13 (Michael Tonry ed., 1996).
Forward-looking goals include moral reformation, reparation, and reconciliation. Michael
Tonry & Mary Lynch, Intermediate Sanctions, in 20 CRIME AND JUSTICE: A REVIEw OF
RESEARCH 99, 133 (Michael Tonry ed., 1996).
10 Duff, supra note 9, at 74.
11 Id. at 10 (noting that these are simply peripheral, if not wholly irrelevant,
considerations for the retributivist).
12 Id.
13 Dolinko, supra note 3, at 1626 (explaining how retributivists "claim that what
makes the practice of punishment morally permissible is that criminals deserve
punishment"). Hence, the term "just deserts."
14 Id. at 1627 (outlining Immanuel Kant's proclamation that punishment "can never
be used merely as a means to promote some other good for the criminal himself or for
civil society, but.., must in all cases be imposed on him only on the ground that he has
committed a crime." (citation omitted)).
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Several eminent philosophers illustrate the central themes that
underscore the retributivist model. For example, C.W.K. Mundle explains,
"the fact that a person has committed a moral offence provides a sufficient
reason for his being made to suffer." 15 H.J. McCloskey echoes the central
theme of retributivist proponents, suggesting that "if the deserved
punishment is inflicted, all we need do to justify it is to point out that the
crime committed deserved and merited such punishment." 16 Philosopher
Michael Moore explains that "[t]he distinctive aspect of retributivism is that
the moral desert of an offender is a sufficient reason to punish him or her.' 17
These theorists highlight the proposition that retributivism exists not for
social utility, but rather for the purpose of inflicting punishment for its own
sake. The more troublesome query for retributivists is that, while a criminal
may "deserve" punishment, it is not always apparent in what form and to
what extent this punishment should be inflicted.
B. Retributivism and the Proportionality Doctrine
Retributivist theory not only views punishment as a good in and of itself,
but it also seeks to render the "appropriate" punishment for the criminal
offender. 18  The retributivist seeks just punishment, manifested by
punishment that is proportional to the severity of the criminal act. 19 This
compels an inquiry not merely into whether an individual deserves
punishment, but into exactly what type of punishment the individual
deserves.20 This idea represents a crucial component of the retributivist
15 Id. (quoting C.W.K. Mundle, Punishment and Desert, 4 PHIL. Q. 216, 221
(1954)).
16 Id. at 1627-28 (quoting H.J. McCloskey, A Non-Utilitarian Approach to
Punishment, 8 INQUIRY 249, 260 (1965)).
17 Id. at 1628 (quoting Michael S. Moore, The Moral Worth of Retribution, in
RESPONSIBILITY, CHARACTER, AND THE EMOTIONS: NEW ESSAYS IN MORAL PSYCHOLOGY
179, 180 (Ferdinand Schoeman ed., 1987)).
18 Id. at 1636.
19 Id. In this way, retributivism differentiates itself from the often criticized
deterrence theory. The retributivist school of thought holds that a deterrent approach
inherently uses people in an improper manner inflicting suffering on the person punished
as a device to compel others to act in a certain way. Id. at 1631.
20 Id. at 1628.
I see nothing methodologically unsound in putting forward the crucial tenet of
retributivism, that punishment is morally justified insofar as it is just, that justice is
moral consideration with regard to punishment, as a fundamental moral
principle .... [P]unishment is just when it is deserved, and it is deserved by the
commission of an offense. The offense committed is the sole ground of the state's
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model. Retributivists believe that the "proportionality" facet of their
approach adequately respects the individual as an autonomous person, not as
a tool for a higher societal good.21
Some examples illustrate the retributivist notion of "proportionality."
Simply stated, retributivists would punish serious crimes more harshly than
minor ones.22 The severity of punishment is always contingent upon the
seriousness of the offense.23 For example, an individual who is guilty of
homicide may receive life in prison, while another individual who is guilty of
theft may only receive a modicum of community service. Retributivists
would simply assign greater penalties as an individual ascends the scale of
criminal offenses. 24 Retributivists claim that we can adequately apportion the
type" of punishment an individual deserves.25 As will be demonstrated, these
theoretical underpinnings are at the core of the approach adopted in our
criminal justice system.
C. The Criminal Justice System Utilizes Retributivism as a Central
Objective Underlying Criminal Reform26
Before retributivism and punishment gained ascendancy in American
criminal jurisprudence, the courts adopted approaches that sought to reform,
rather than punish, the criminal offender. Indeed, during the mid-twentieth
century, rehabilitation was cited as a dominant objective behind our criminal
justice system.27 During this period, the New York City Correction
Commissioner stated that "[a]ll men are redeemable. Every man can be
right and duty to punish... Justice in these matters is to treat offenders according to
their deserts, to give them what they deserve, not more, not less.
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting IGOR PRIMORATZ, JUSTIFYING LEGAL PUNISHMENT
147-48 (1989)).
2.1 Id. at 1636. ("[The claim that the amount of punishment inflicted on offenders
must be what they deserve is crucial to the retributivist claim not to use people as mere
means.").
22 Id.
23 Id.
24 Id. ('Unfortunately, this prescription by itself cannot tell us what punishment any
particular crime actually deserves, even if we could rank every crime in a single scale
from least to most serious.").
25 Id. Some retributivist thinkers have attempted to quantify a system under which
punishment would be apportioned proportionality. For example, John Kleinig believes
that we can make a linear scale to rank crimes from least to most serious. Id.
26 This reference to the criminal justice system encompasses both the legislative and
judicial branches of government.
27 E.g., Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241,248 (1949).
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rehabilitated, and it's up to us in the community and in the field of criminal
justice to see that this is done."'28 The Supreme Court echoed these
sentiments in Williams v. New York,29 explaining that "reformation and
rehabilitation of offenders have become important goals of criminal
jurisprudence. '30 Measures such as indeterminate sentencing, individualized
sentences, parole, probation, alternative treatment programs, and increased
discretion for judges permeated the criminal justice system. 31 These
mechanisms underscored the belief that the criminal system needed to "cure"
the offender by apportioning penalties that "fit" the individual more than the
crime itself.32 Consequently, rehabilitation ascended in the mid-twentieth
century as the dominant penological response to criminal behavior.33
However, the use of rehabilitation in the criminal system was a
conspicuous failure.34 By the 1970s, the optimism and idealism that
characterized the reformation movement slowly began to evaporate, as
rehabilitation experienced a series of vicious criticisms, examining both its
theoretical foundations and practical efficacy.35 In the widely circulated
study Struggle for Justice, the use of indeterminate sentencing was criticized
28 Michael Vitiello, Reconsidering Rehabilitation, 65 TUL. L. REV. 1011, 1012
(1991) (citing Martin Tolchin, Malcolm, a Black, Named Correctional Chief by Mayor,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 1972, at 1, reprinted in MARVIN E. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL
SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER 91 (1973)).
29 Williams, 337 U.S. at 248.
30 Id. at 247. The Williams Court stated the following:
Undoubtedly the New York statutes emphasize a prevalent modem philosophy of
penology that the punishment should fit the offender and not merely the crime. The
belief no longer prevails that every offense in a like legal category calls for an
identical punishment without regard to the past life and habits of a particular
offender... retribution is no longer the dominant objective of the criminal law.
Id. (citations omitted).
31 Vitiello, supra note 28, at 1016. The implementation of these programs was based
on the perception "of the criminal as sick and in need of treatment or rehabilitation." Id.
32 See, e.g., James Robison & Gerald Smith, The Effectiveness of Correctional
Programs, in SENTENCING 118 (Hyman Gross & Andrew von Hirsch eds., 1981).
33 Vitiello, supra note 28, at 1014.
34 Robinson & Smith, supra note 32. A study by the California Rehabilitation Center
found that, of those enrolled in the rehabilitation program, 67% had to be returned for
further treatment, 33% received a new criminal conviction during their first release, and
71% were detected as having used drugs illegally. These findings exemplified the failure
of rehabilitative efforts; see also Vitiello, supra note 28, at 1014 (explaining that by the
mid 1960s, widespread criticism began to circulate that attacked the efficacy of the
rehabilitative model).
35 AMERICAN FRIENDS SERV. COMM., STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE 6-12 (1971)
[hereinafter STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE].
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as a "tool of institutional control" used to increase "the power of the state to
lengthen a prisoner's sentence. '36 Struggle for Justice also identified a class
bias within rehabilitation programs, where whites were treated less harshly, 37
leading to gross inequities in length of sentences for similar conduct.38 Judge
Marvin Frankel joined in, criticizing the discretionary power rehabilitation
afforded judges, explaining that "the almost wholly unchecked and sweeping
powers we give to judges.. [is] intolerable for a society that professes
devotion to the rule of law."'39 He also criticized the parole system as without
any direction or means to achieve its purported objectives.40 This procedural
laxity, according to Judge Frankel, perpetuated countless abuses within a
system that seemingly espoused benevolent objectives.41 The legislature
subsequently chimed in, with Ted Kennedy accusing rehabilitation of being a
"national scandal" that "breeds massive injustice." 42 Society also expressed
its distaste, and the infamous Willie Horton scandal was the culmination of a
rehabilitation system that had lost its way and failed in its purpose.43 As a
3 6 Vitiello, supra note 28, at 1020 (quoting STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE, supra note 35,
at 28).
37 Id. at 1021.
A treatment-oriented system allowed the moral hypocrites to mollycoddle upper-
and middle-class criminals because, although they are "morally weak and
psychologically deficient .... they are not revolutionaries." Surely, a fallen member
of the ruling class will need less reformative treatment than a member of the lower
class who has not had the same advantages.
Id. (quoting STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE, supra note 35, at 30) (citation omitted).
38 Id.
39 Id. at 1022, quoted in STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE, supra note 35, at 7.
40 Id. at 1023 "We charge [parole boards] to make indeterminate sentences
determinate, yet we give them no conceptual or other tools to work with. We set them
lofty goals of rehabilitation, but with no direction or means of achievement." Id. (quoting
FRANKEL, supra note 28, at 95).
41 Id. at 1023-24. Judge Frankel devoted his energy to establishing legislative
reform of the inadequate indeterminate sentencing regime. Id. ("[Judge Frankel's]
specific proposals provided a game plan for Congress when it eventually created a
sentencing commission and empowered it to set up sentencing guidelines.").
4 2 Id. at 1015 (quoting Ted Kennedy, Introduction to Symposium on Sentencing (pt.
1), 7 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1, 1 (1978).
43 Willie Horton was a convicted murderer who was granted temporary release on
selected week-ends pursuant to Massachusetts' "weekend furlough" program. During one
of these releases, Horton committed another murder, prompting societal outrage and a
call for "tougher" sentences for criminals. Paul Duggan, The Barneses and the Horton
Debate; The Couple's Role in the Bush Campaign, WASH. POST, Oct. 28, 1988, at D8.
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result, in the mid-1970s rehabilitation fell out of favor as a legitimate
penological objective in criminal jurisprudence. 44
In its place arose the retributivist model with a consequential resurrection
of punishment. The Comprehensive Crime Control Act (CCCA) of 198445
effectively ended the era of rehabilitation and ushered in the era of
retribution and punishment. 46 The CCCA implemented determinate
sentences for criminal offenders, eliminated parole, and removed judicial
discretion in decision-making by appropriating inflexible sentencing
guidelines. 47 In effect, the Act sought to remedy the flaws that had led to the
failure of rehabilitation in the criminal courts. By adopting this legislation,
retributivism was resurrected in the latter part of the twentieth century. 48 The
retributivist trend continues today, in both the legislative and judicial milieu,
to enjoy support as a central objective underlying criminal reform. Whether it
is the passing of legislation or the rendering of judicial decisions,
punishment, not rehabilitation, is the consistent response of our system to
criminal behavior. Indeed, the penological nature of our criminal
jurisprudence is clearly manifested in two distinct areas: (1) "three strikes
and you're out" laws;49 and (2) the death penalty.
1. "Three Strikes and You're Out": The Legislatures at the Federal and
State Level Send a Retributivist Message
Habitual offender laws are paradigmatic of the retributivist motivations
that drive many legislative enactments. The retributivist underpinnings that
lie at the heart of habitual offender laws such as "three strikes" can be traced
back to the sixteenth century and colonial America. 50 Early legislation
"sought to inflict harsh penalties on offenders who committed ... crimes a
44 See generally FRANCIS A. ALLEN, THE DECLINE OF THE REHABILITATIVE IDEAL
(198 1) (surveying the fall of rehabilitation as a central aim of criminal jurisprudence).
45 Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1837 (1984) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 18 U.S.C.).
46 Vitiello, supra note 28, at 1014, 1027.
47 Id. at 1027.
48 Id. at 1025-33. (outlining the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, which took a more
retributive approach to criminal jurisprudence).
49 "Three strikes" does not run afoul of retributive justice because after a third
violent felony, life imprisonment without parole is a punishment proportional to such
repeated acts of violence. Dolinko, supra note 3, at 1628.
50 Michael Turner et al., "Three Strikes and You're Out" Legislation: A National
Assessment, 59 FED. PROBATION, Sept. 1995, at 16, 17.
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specified number of times." 51 Over time, habitual offender legislation
proceeded to encompass a wider range of offenders within the purview of
respective statutes.52 Habitual offender laws continued to focus on
punishment as the appropriate societal response, as "these laws ensured that
more severe punishment would follow each conviction. '53 For Example, in
1797, New York enacted habitual offender legislation-later repealed-
requiring "offenders convicted of their second felony to be sentenced to
prison 'at hard labor or in solitude.., for life.' 54
Other state legislatures followed suit with similar statutes, and habitual
offender legislation flourished in the early twentieth century.55 Six states
passed additional habitual offender statutes in the 1920s.56 By 1968, twenty-
three states had enacted legislation that mandated life imprisonment after a
designated number of offenses.57 In addition, nine states had mandatory
minimum prison sentences for repeat offenders, and the remaining states
permitted habitual offenders to be sentenced to increased prison terms. 58
Consistently, these repeat offender statutes have imparted retributivist
undertones, with harsh penalties serving as the dominant legislative response
to repeat criminal offenders.59
These retributivist-driven statutes continue to sustain popularity at both
the federal and state level, manifested by the novel "three strikes" legislation.
Under "three strikes" law, an individual who commits three felonies
automatically receives life imprisonment with no possibility of parole.60 In
1994, President Clinton signed into law the Crime Bill of 1994, expressly
heralding the "three strikes and you're out" provision.61 This idea has also
51 Id. (citing W. F. McDonald, et al., Repeat Offender Laws in the United States:
Their Form, Use, and Perceived Value, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, NAT'L INST. OF JUST.
(1986)).
52 Id. (citing Sir Leon Radzinowicz & Roger Hood, Incapacitating the Habitual
Criminal: The English Experience, 78 MICH. L. REv. 1307, 1305-89 (1980)).
53 Id.
54 Id. (quoting Susan Buckley, Don't Steal a Turkey in Arkansas-The Second Felony
Offender in New York, 45 FORDHAM L. REv. 76, 80 n.39 (1976)).
55 Id. ("Most notable was the enactment of the Baume's Law by the State of New
York in 1926, which required life imprisonment for third-time felony offenders.").
56 Id.
57 Id.
58 Id.
59 Id.
60Id. at 16.
61 Alternative Punishments, supra note 2, at 1968 (citing Stephen Glass, Anatomy of
a Policy Fraud, NEw REPUBLIc, Nov. 17, 1997, at 22).
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entered prominence at the state level, with California being the first to
implement "three strikes and you're out" legislation.62 This was only the
genesis of "three strikes" legislation, as 73% of voters enacted similar
legislation in Washington State.63 Currently, more than thirty-seven
jurisdictions have proposed "three strikes" laws, and fifteen jurisdictions
have enacted "three strikes" legislation.64 Over 90% remove judicial
discretion by requiring the judge to sentence the convicted offender as a
habitual offender, and over 80% of these proposals aim to sentence habitual
offenders to prison for life.65 Moreover, the Kentucky and Pennsylvania
legislatures have made the death penalty an option for judges who are
sentencing individuals for their third felony.66
These statutes, and the uniformity with which they are being enacted,
demonstrate that legislatures are opting for retribution, through punishment,
rather than rehabilitation via treatment. 67 The current trend is indicative of
the larger historical paradigm-punishment consistently represents the moral
choice for redress when an individual transgresses the criminal code. The
response from federal and state legislatures is uniformly punitive, resulting in
a criminal system that places its values almost exclusively on punishment
and retribution. Indeed, this approach has also received the imprimatur from
the judiciary.
62 Gareth Cook, Issues, Issues, Issues, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Nov. 21, 1994, at
28. Attorney General Dan Lungren has championed this notion, going so far as to credit
"three strikes and you're out" with reducing the overall crime rate in California. Id.; see
also, Cindy Moy, California: Out-of State Convictions Count as Strike, WEST'S LEGAL
NEws, Dec. 10, 1996, at 1996 WL 704865.
63 Floyd Pedee, Let's Try Law from Washington, FLA. TODAY, Mar. 22, 1999, at
08A.
64 Turner et al., supra note 50, at 19, 25. Furthermore, Georgia, Alabama, New
York, Louisiana, and Vermont have adopted "two strikes and you're out" provisions,
endorsing an even more drastic approach. Id.
65 Id. at 33. In addition, these statutes seek to minimize the opportunity for an
offender to be released on parole. Id. Clearly, these statutes evince retributivist
undertones, as they seek to supplant judicial discretion with stringent, non-discretionary
guidelines that accord the judge minimal latitude in sentencing the offender. Id.
66Id. at 19.
67 This movement is driven by "tough on crime" politicians who believe
incarceration and punishment are the best way to restore social order. Id. at 16.
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2. The Death Penalty: Gregg v. Georgia and the Affirmance of
Retribution as a Dominant Penological Goal
In Gregg v. Georgia,68 the Court echoed the sentiment that retribution
continues to serve as the dominant force behind the punishment-centered
criminal courts. In Gregg, the issue before the Court was the constitutionality
of recently enacted death penalty statutes.69 The Gregg Court held that the
death penalty did not amount to cruel and unusual punishment for purposes
of the Eighth Amendment.70 Instead, the Court determined that the death
penalty served a valid penological purpose.71 In arriving at this decision, the
Court explicitly cited retributivism as a valid penological goal. Justice
Stevens explained as follows:
The instinct for retribution is part of the nature of man, and channeling that
instinct in the administration of criminal justice serves an important purpose
in promoting the stability of a society governed by law. When people begin
to believe that organized society is unwilling or unable to impose upon
criminal offenders the punishment they 'deserve,' then there are sown the
seeds of anarchy of self-help, vigilante justice, and lynch law.72
In Thompson v. Oklahoma,73 Justice Stevens re-iterated these thoughts,
suggesting that "as 'an expression of society's moral outrage at particularly
offensive conduct,' retribution was not 'inconsistent with our respect for the
dignity of men."' 74 In Furman v. Georgia,75 Justice Stewart, referring to the
death penalty, explained, "[i]t is unique in its rejection of rehabilitation of the
convict as a basic purpose of criminal justice. And it is unique, finally, in its
absolute renunciation of all that is embodied in our concept of humanity. 76
68 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
69 Id. at 183 ("[C]apital punishment is an expression of society's moral outrage at
particularly offensive conduct. This function may be unappealing to many, but it is
essential in an ordered society that asks its citizens to rely on legal processes rather than
self-help to vindicate their wrongs." (citation omitted)).70 Id. at 169 ("We now hold that the punishment of death does not invariably violate
the Constitution.").
71 Id.
72 Id. at 183 (quoting Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 308 (1971) (Stewart, J.,
concurring)).
73 Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1987).
74 Id. at 836 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1876)).
75 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1971).76 Id. at 306 (Stewart J., concurring).
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Clearly, these statements illustrate that "the law typifies the ascension of a
'just deserts' penal philosophy .... "77 As a result, the retributivist directive
has permeated our criminal system, heavily influencing the manner in which
criminals are treated.
The adoption of the retributivist model of punishment equates to an
implicit rejection of utilizing ADR mechanisms, such as mediation, to
resolve criminal disputes. As we will see below, mediation is an alternative
forum where parties work collectively to search for creative solutions that
respond to parties needs, not stringent legal directives. 78 In mediation, for
example, parties are not predisposed to a specific solution because specific
resolutions are not predetermined.79 This inherently recognizes the premise
that different solutions may be necessitated in different situations. However,
this approach has been rejected by our criminal system in favor of a strict
"uniformity" that singularly appropriates punishment, regardless of the type
of case, crime or individual involved. Because of the stringent legal
imperative, flexibility in unearthing inventive solutions is nominal, creativity
becomes obsolete, and imagination is ignored. Thus, ADR, namely
mediation, has no role to play because punishment represents a
predetermined solution that varies in degree but never in kind. The criminal
system never seeks to respond individually to the offender, because it
impersonally appropriates punishment as the moral choice for redress, even if
a better solution would be plausible. Unfortunately, the retributivist-centered
approach now adopted by the criminal courts has not enjoyed universal
success, particularly in the adjudication of crimes of addiction.
Im. ThE FAmIURE OF THE RETRIBUTIVIST-CENTERED
CRIMINAL COURTS IN ADJUDICATING CRIMES OF ADDICTION
While retributivism may be an invaluable and necessary tool in cases
involving violent felons or habitual transgressors, 80 the utilization of
77 Alternative Punishments, supra note 2, at 1987.
78 See generally FORREST S. MOSTEN, THE COMPLETE GUIDE TO MEDIATION (1997)
(outlining the various types of mediation techniques that are employed to resolve
disputes, and studying in depth the advantages and disadvantages of utilizing mediation
in certain settings).
79 Id.
80 The purpose of this Note is not to suggest that retributivism ineffective in all
circumstances. Instead, this Note endeavors to make a narrower point: that retributivism
is ineffective in dealing specifically with crimes of addiction. This inherently recognizes
that different criminal responses may be required depending on the nature and type of
offense committed.
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punishment for crimes of addiction has unfortunately been a conspicuous
failure. Envision the following hypothetical situation: an individual is
arrested and convicted for a vicious and cold-blooded murder. Most of us
would agree that incarceration is a plausible judicial response, because it
serves to remove the individual from society, thereby eliminating the threat
of violence that he may pose to the community. We would probably concur
that for many violent offenders, incarceration is necessary to achieve the goal
and protect the community. In these circumstances, punishment via
incarceration seems to be a valid penological objective.
However, imagine an individual who is repeatedly arrested for driving
while intoxicated (DWI),81 or an individual arrested for non-violent drug
possession, or public intoxication while exiting a bar or restaurant. In all of
the above mentioned situations, there is no "victim," at least not in the same
sense as in violent offenses. Yet, these offenders are processed through the
same criminal system that deals with murderers and rapists. The response,
incarceration, is the same for crimes of addiction as it is for violent criminal
offenders. 82 But is punishment really an effective remedy in these situations?
It is central to this Note that the retributivist-minded criminal courts are
entirely ineffective, and wholly inappropriate, in adjudicating crimes of
addiction. If we base the success of the criminal system on the vindication of
the societal interest in seeing this behavior eradicated and the public welfare
preserved, then the criminal system fails in adjudicating crimes of addiction
for two reasons. First, by uniformly adopting punishment as its institutional
response, the criminal courts have utterly failed to alleviate the addictions
that lie at the source of these criminal acts. Thus, by failing to "reform" these
offenders, the court system has perpetuated high recidivism rates, thereby
keeping the community at risk. Moreover, despite these failures and the
81 When referring to DWI cases, I am assuming that no victim is involved. Some
drunk driving incidents have resulted in fatalities, and for this particular sub-set of drunk
driving crimes, retribution may be a plausible response. However, most DWI offenses are
"victimless." Bill Teeter, Legal Aliens with DWI Records are Arrested, Sparking
Protests, FORT WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM, Sept. 4, 1998, at 4 (commenting on the DWI
arrests made in Texas along the border). In this scenario, programs that treat the
underlying addiction are recommended. Such a response is especially plausible, because
by treating the addiction at the outset, we may avoid the "fatal" DWI incidents that often
occur at the hands of repeat offenders. See David S. Fallis & Katherine Shaver,
Loopholes Benefit Defendants; Drunken Drivers Learn to Circumvent System (pt. 2),
WASH. POST, Sept. 25, 2000, at A01.
82 In fact, many first-time offenders do not even receive prison terms. Instead, they
are released on probation to repeat the same crime. In 1997, in New Jersey, of the
513,200 people convicted of DWI, 454,000 were placed on probation. Pete Yost, 58,000
Drunken Drivers in Jail Another 454,000 on Probation, REC., June 14, 1999, at A12.
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tragedies they have engendered, the criminal system continues to be
committed to its tradition of punishment in these cases. Second, even if the
criminal system sought to adopt remedies that treated the addiction
underlying these criminal acts, they would be structurally unable to do so.
Because of the criminal system's adherence to strict procedural formality,
and its commitment to adversarial dispute resolution, the courts are
structurally unable to successfully adopt solutions that address the cause-
addiction-of these crimes. The criminal courts are both unwilling and
unable to adopt responses that have a practical chance for successfully
adjudicating crimes of addiction.
A. Despite Its Failure in Adjudicating Crimes of Addiction, the Criminal
Courts Remain Committed to the Failed Solution of Punishment
In the criminal courts, punishment, primarily imprisonment, is the
penalty for individuals who are convicted of crimes of addiction. However,
incarceration has proved completely ineffective, as evidenced by the
recidivism rates of these offenders. For example, in New Jersey, the
recidivism rate for drug offenders processed through the criminal courts is an
astonishing 70%.83 In the state of Florida, the recidivism rate for drug
offenders is between 60 and 70%.84 In New York, the recidivism rate is
approximately 40%.85 A recent study in Pittsburgh placed its recidivism rate
at 70%.86 These figures pale in comparison to the national rate-across the
country, the average recidivism rate for drug offenders processed through the
83 A drop in recidivism also serves to save the state and the taxpayers significant
financial capital. In county jails, more than 70% of convictions were the result of
substance abuse. Editorial, Try Drug Treatment, STAR-LEDGER, Jan. 15, 2000, at D12
available at 2000 WL 4252336.
84 Mark Killian, Governor Bush Calls for Greater Use of Drug Courts, FLA. B.
NEWS 15, Nov. 15, 1999; Christopher Rebel J. Pace, The Law Enforcement Community
from Coast to Coast Is Turning to These Courts Because They Save Time, Money, and
Lives, LEGAL TIMES, Jan. 23, 1995, at 44 (explaining that the drug courts are cost-
effective and significantly reduce the recidivism rate-only 10-33% of drug court
"graduates" are re-arrested for post-graduation drug offenses).
85 Gary Spenser, Assembly Leaders Unveil Crime Package, N.Y. L.J., Mar. 3, 1994,
at 1, 2.
86 Ben Schmitt, Drug Court Offers a Second Chance at Productive Life, DAILY REP.,
Apr. 12, 1999, at 4 (reporting on the various attributes of the drug courts and the
advantages that they can offer to participants.) Drug courts not only benefit the
participants, but serve to inform judges as well. As Michael Flaherty, Vice President of
St. Francis Center For Addiction, explains, "It's a behavioristic program, one that also
requires judges to understand the nature of addiction." Id.
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criminal courts is an overwhelming 77%.87 More than three-quarters of
convicted drug offenders are repeating the same offenses of which they were
initially convicted. In the case of alcohol-related offenses such as DWI, the
statistics are equally as grim. For example, in New Jersey, over 30% of DWI
offenders are repeat offenders. 88 Moreover, almost 10% of convicted DWI
offenders in New Jersey have been convicted three or more times for the
same offense.89 These statistics demonstrate that the criminal courts are
failing in their effort to prevent repeat offenses.
In addition to the statistics, legislators and regulators at both the federal
and state level are acknowledging traditional punishment's failure to reduce
recidivism for these categories of crimes. For example, Terry Schiavone,
President of the National Commission Against Drunk Driving, explains that
without alcohol treatment programs, "these are just drunk drivers waiting to
get back on the road" because "U]ail and probation have never cured the
drunken driving problem." 90 Bob Voas, a researcher for the Pacific Institute
in Maryland, notes, "[t]he problem with jail is that it does take the person off
the road when they are behind bars, but if you put them in jail for six days,
you haven't done much with the problem." 91 Senator Louis Kosco of New
Jersey concedes that, "just putting someone in prison for 30 days does
nothing." 92 Judge Charles Hill, who once believed in incarceration for drug
offenders, admits "[d]rug addicts need help."93
However, despite these admitted failures, the criminal justice system
remains committed to providing punitive responses for these offenders. New
Jersey represents a case in point-Senator Kosco echoes the dedication to
punishment, stating "I hope for stronger penalties for people who are
convicted of drunk driving .... ,,94 Indeed, punishment is precisely the
87 Id.
88 Yost, supra note 82.
89 Id.
90 Id. Schiavone points out that these figures represent failure in dealing with those
offenders who have a serious problem with alcohol. Furthermore, those offenders with
substance abuse.problems represent a significant portion of all arrestees. Id.
91 Doug Most, State May Get Harder On DWI Repeaters a Focus On Drivers
Flouting Revocation, REC., Aug. 2, 1999, at A01.
9 2 Id.
93 Treatment-Based Courts Saving Oklahoma Money, J. REC., July 8, 1999,
available at 1999 WL 9847060 [hereinafter Treatment-Based Courts]. Judge Hill, a
former police officer for twenty years, endorses the drug court approach as the best way
to rehabilitate substance abusers. Judge Now a Believer in Drug Court Approach,
ASSOCIATED PRESS NEWSWIRES, July 6, 1999, at WL, 7/6/99 APWIRES 02:07:00
[hereinafter Judge Now a Believer].
94 Most, supra note 91.
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approach that New Jersey has endorsed. For example, in 1997, 513,200
individuals were convicted for DWI.95 Of these offenders, 454,000 were
placed on probation, while 41,100 were placed in local jails.96 The remaining
17,600 offenders were incarcerated in state prison. 97 In terms of strict
"proportionality," DWI offenders who were placed in local jails served an
average confinement of eleven months.98 Individuals who were placed in
state prison were confined for an average of forty-nine months.99 Thus,
despite its apparent failure, New Jersey seems committed to punishing crimes
of addiction. Treatment, or diversionary programs imparting a rehabilitative
approach, are simply not options for DWI offenders in New Jersey.
In addition to New Jersey, Illinois, Connecticut, and Vermont have
responded to alcohol related crimes of addiction by permanently revoking a
person's license after theirfourth DWI conviction. 100 In Illinois, drug-related
crimes of addiction are garnering prison terms every year. 101 Last year,
approximately 40% of drug offenders were sentenced to prison, and the
number is increasing annually. 102 South Carolina and West Virginia have
responded with license revocation punishment after multiple repeat
offenses. 10 3 Some states have even turned punishment into humiliation,
pJacing stickers on offenders' cars so that everyone knows they are DWI
offenders. 10 4 Illinois Prosecutor Alphonse Tomaso states, "[a]n arrest in [the
drug] area is a serious offense and we intend to prosecute those cases. '"10 5
Despite astronomical recidivism rates, and the fact that over 30% of arrested
individuals admit that they drink every day and use drugs, the data illustrates
95 Yost, supra note 82. Many of those arrested were repeat offenders. Id.
96 Id.
97 Id.
98 Id.
99 Id.
100 Most, supra note 91, at A01; see generally Peter H. Lederman, Letters to the
Editor, Little Due Process in DWI Cases, N.J. LAW.: WKLY. NEWSPAPER, Mar. 24, 1997,
at 6, available at LEXIS, News Library, News Group File.
101 Martha Middleton, Do Drug Courts Work?, NAT'LLAW J., Nov. 2, 1992, at 1.
102 Id. at 45.
103 Most, supra note 91, at A01.
104 Id. This strategy amounts to nothing more than humiliation and embarrassment.
Such a strategy is especially bizarre considering the fact that many DWI offenders
candidly admit to having a substance abuse problem. Yost, supra note 82.
105 Middleton, supra note 101 (second alteration in original). Tomaso further states,
"The law in the state of Illinois is a zero drug tolerance policy." Id. at 45.
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that punishment continues to be the predominant legislative response.10 6
However, these results do not seem to be sparking any reformation in the
traditional paradigm.
Unfortunately, the perpetuation of high recidivist rates and commitment
to a failed remedy has consequences; it has had tragic results. Recidivism
rates are responsible for several tragedies that might have been avoided had
the addiction been treated at the outset. A case in point is Scott Arp, a New
Jersey driver, who had been arrested repeatedly for drunk driving in New
Jersey.107 Like other drunk drivers, Arp was processed through the criminal
courts, given punishment, and released.10 8 No attempts were made to address
his potential alcohol addiction or to divert him to a treatment program.' 09
Consequently, a short time after his release, Arp drove drunk again-this
time crashing his truck through the windshield of a Volkswagen Jetta. 110
Dennis Curtin of Cresskill, New Jersey was killed in the crash.11I New Jersey
Highway Patrolman Pete O'Hagan explains that victims of addiction, "are
the ones most likely to have the crashes." 112 The case of Scott Arp
exemplifies the inherent tragedies in a system that has little effect on treating
the underlying problem-substance abuse.1 13
In sum, the previous discussion highlights the proposition that, as long as
the criminal system remains committed to punishment, there will be high
recidivism rates, more tragedies like Scott Arp, and a perpetual threat to the
community. Because of the criminal system's failure to search for alternative
remedies in lieu of punishment, there remains little hope of vindicating the
106 This is clear evidence that many of these offenders are suffering from substance
abuse problems. In fact, in a survey of convicted DWI offenders (1) about half admitted
consuming approximately 12 beers in the hours before their arrest, (2) approximately half
admitted they had been drinking for at least three hours before their arrest, and (3) about
half reported that they had been in treatment programs for their problem. This clearly
shows that for a large majority of offenders, addiction lies at the source of these criminal
acts. Yost, supra note 82.
107 Most, supra note 91.
108 Id.
109 Id.
110 Id.
I Id.
112 Id.
113 Id. Scott Arp is certainly not an exception. There are many individuals who, like
Arp, are repeat offenders who still pose a dangerous threat to the community. For
example, Robert Speidel, a former New Jersey teacher, has been arrested for drunk
driving three times: and, Marc Masciulli, also of New Jersey, has attained nine DWI
arrests. Id. These problems are no surprise in a system that does nothing to treat the
addictions that underlie these criminal acts.
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important societal interest of eradicating the threat of drugs and alcohol that
lie at the core of these criminal acts. However, the problem does not merely
end at the criminal system's reluctance to entertain alternative solutions. An
integral part of the criminal system's failure lies in the fact that even if the
criminal courts sought to adopt alternative solutions that addressed the core
of the problem, the courts would be structurally unable to do so. Indeed, it is
this very structure that previously ruined rehabilitation attempts in the
criminal courts.
B. The Structural Formality of the Criminal System Renders It
Unable to Successfully Implement Alternative Solutions
The criminal court system is traditionally characterized by judicial
proceedings conducted with stringent formality. 114 Formal procedures are
adopted, in the opinion of the court system, to ensure equality and fairness
among all participants. 115 First, the criminal courts place heavy emphasis on
procedural formality. For example, judges, are required wear formal black
robes, to ensure the appearance of neutrality. 116 Judges do not interact with
the parties, instead acting primarily as a referee among the disputants in a
given case. 117 Pursuant to stare decisis, the judge is frequently limited to
consider only previously developed legal principles in her decision making
process. 118 In addition, the jury is admonished to ignore all extraneous
evidence, considering only evidence presented at the trial itself.119 Moreover,
the rules of evidence formalize and limit the presentation of evidence. For
example, only legally relevant evidence is admissible at trial, and frequently
relevant evidence is inadmissible because it is found to be unduly
prejudicial. 120 The rules of discovery also formalize and limit both the
114 Judith Resnik, Many Doors, Closing Doors? Alternative Dispute Resolution and
Adjudication, 10 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 211, 241 (1995) (exploring the various
benefits and drawbacks of utilizing alternative dispute resolution as opposed to traditional
adjudication).
115 Richard Delgado et al., Fairness and Formality: Minimizing the Risk of
Prejudice in Alternative Dispute Resolution, 1985 Wis. L. REv. 1359, 1388 (studying the
effects that alternative dispute resolution can have on minority groups).
116 Id. Indeed, judges rarely, if ever, assume an "interventionist" posture in a
dispute.117 Id.
118 Id. at 1368.
119 Id. at 1370 (stating that if a juror does consider extraneous evidence the juror
may be removed from the case).
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amount and type of information that is obtainable from the opposing party.121
These procedures evince the notion that the criminal system strives to attain
an orderly and predictable trial environment-one that is insulated from
outside information or extraneous influence.
In addition to procedural formality, there is a communicative formality
that governs how, when, and in what manner each side is permitted to speak
at trial. For example, the client normally does not utter a word at trial, and is
instead represented by an attorney who acts as an intermediary, representing
the voice of the client. Furthermore, the attorney's communicative ability is
governed by strict time and manner restraints.122 As Delgado explains, the
attorney "[h]as a prescribed time and manner for speaking, putting on
evidence, and questioning the other side." 123 The attorney, speaking for the
client, may speak only to the judge, never to the other party. As Delgado
states, "[c]ounsel for the parties do not address one another, but present the
issue to the trier of fact."'124 By doing this, communicative constraints go a
long way to fostering an adversarial relationship among the parties because it
avoids party interaction, it discourages client involvement, and rejects
"irrelevant" or extraneous information.1 25  These procedural and
communicative restraints "[p]reserve the formality of the setting by dictating
in detail how this confrontation is to be conducted." 126 While this stringent
formality may be invaluable in certain instances, it has particular drawbacks
that make its structure especially unsuitable for adjudicating certain crimes of
addiction and fashioning a successful alternative solution.
120 FED. R. EVID. 404 (explaining that if the probative value of the evidence is
outweighed by a danger of undue prejudice, confusion of issues, or unfair delay, then it
will be inadmissible in a court of law).
121 FED. R. Civ. P. 26. There are many situations in which these formalized rules
may be invaluable. For example, these rules may force a party to turn over evidence to
which the other side may never have had access to. In these situations, the formality does
have value. However, where the object is to get at the core of a personalized addiction,
strict formality is less beneficial.
12 2 See generally Delgado et a., supra note 115, at 1388 ("Our judicial system, in
particular, has incorporated societal norms of fairness and even-handedness, into
institutional expectations and rules of procedure.... The rules preserve the formality of
the setting by dictating in detail how this confrontation is to be conducted.").
123 Ild
.
124 Id. This aspect of the formal judicial process discourages party interaction, which
goes a long way toward fostering a sense of remoteness among the participants.
125Id.
12 6 Id.
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1. Procedural and Communicative Formalities Inhibit Open
Communication and Cooperation Among the Parties
Formality inhibits direct and open communication among the parties. As
Resnik explains, "[t]he procedural requirements of adjudication are described
as roadblocks to communication.. ."127 Strict formality inhibits effective
communication because it only allows certain information to enter the
courtroom, leaving out information that, while not "legally relevant," could
nonetheless have significant value both to the parties and the decision-
maker.128 Formal legal protocol can be so complex that the individual's voice
becomes submerged, as she is forced to depend on her lawyer to represent
her position. In addition, party communication, through their lawyers, is
singularly channeled into one source, the judge, which prevents the parties
from initiating open and direct colloquy with the other side. As a result, the
artificial barrier that the court structure erects between them polarizes the
parties. This fosters a sense of distance and estrangement among the parties
because it prohibits the creation of intimate relationships that are often the
product of open communication. "[Formal adjudication avoids the
unstructured, intimate interactions ... the rules of procedure maintain
distance between the parties."'129
The result of decreased communication, and the ensuing distance that it
fosters, is that the parties are afforded no opportunity to work together, as
cooperation becomes an abstract reality. Cooperation can have the effect of
fostering interpersonal relationships among the parties. 130 As a result, parties
may be inclined to work together toward a common goal, communicate more
effectively, gain mutual respect, and accept more responsibility. 131
Collaborative undertakings can have a meaningful impact because they can
facilitate the process of arriving at a mutually beneficial and effective
resolution, allowing the parties to collaboratively probe an issue in an in-
depth, incisive manner. However, the formality of the court system discards
these potential assets and inhibits cooperation by effectively destroying inter
party communication. Not only are the parties hindered in their chance to
unite and cooperate in searching for a resolution, but the ability to get to the
127 Resnik, supra note 114, at 249.
128 See FED. R. EVID. 404.
129 Delgado et al., supra note 115, at 1388 (citation omitted).
130 Deborah L. Levi, The Role of Apology in Mediation, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1165,
1171 (1997) (examining the role that apologizing can have on the ability of parties to
reach a mutually beneficial resolution to their disputes).
131 See id.
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core of a particular issue is also thwarted. As Delgado explains, "the
adversarial process is said to be least effective... for it focuses only on the
symptoms of a problem and makes little effort to delve into its source. ' 132 By
depressing participation, parties are not only polarized, but also ultimately
reduced to passive bystanders who have no role in the problem-solving
process.
The court structure perpetuates an adversarial and confrontational
process of resolving disputes by dispensing with interactive communication
and collaboration. First, by prohibiting interaction between the parties, and
allowing communication only with the judge, the court structure is
positioning parties against each other. By being forced to appeal only to the
sole decision-maker, the parties are indirectly compelled to fashion separate
interests, which are most likely to exist in conflict with the opposing party.
The court directly forces a divergence, instead of convergence, between the
parties and their respective interests and goals. By fostering a dichotomy of
interests, this will inevitably exacerbate each party's self-interest. 133 When
this occurs, the goal of "victory" or "getting your way" becomes the primary
objective of the parties to the litigation. The substantive resolution of
problems takes a back seat to the unmitigated self-interest of competing
parties and the heart of the respective dispute may receive only superficial
treatment. When this happens, the adversarial process inherently reveals its
most negative drawback, "the problem remains after the disputants leave the
courtroom."
134
The danger with this approach is that if the problem of addiction is only
superficially treated through punishment, it remains when the offender leaves
the system. Thus, the community remains at risk that this individual will
commit a similar crime, this time with graver results. 135 This highlights the
premise that the criminal courts, because of their formality, should not
adjudicate crimes of addiction. At the heart of many of these crimes (i.e.,
drug possession, DWI) lies an insidious addiction to alcohol or drugs. 13 6 The
solution to this problem lies in eradication of the underlying addiction. This
132 Delgado et al., supra note 115, at 1367. This is especially nefarious in cases of
crimes of addiction because the crime itself is often the product of a substance abuse
problem. Therefore, by failing to treat the underlying cause, the criminal court is ignoring
the cause of the criminal act. As a result, there is little hope to "reform" the offender.
133 See Resnik, supra note 114, at 250.
134 Delgado et al., supra note 115, at 1367. As a result, the offender is likely to
repeat the same crime whenever he succumbs to his untreated addiction. See Part III.A.
135 See Part III.A.
136 See Yost, supra note 82, at A12 (stating that in New Jersey, 33% of DWI
arrestees admit that they drink alcohol every day and use drugs).
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requires in-depth, extensive probing of the personal circumstances and
situations that lead a person to choose this lifestyle. To accomplish this
difficult task, there must be freewheeling communication and a collective
desire to reach beyond self-interest into the interest of the afflicted
individual. There must also exist the ability to work together, to collaborate
in finding creative solutions that, while not in harmony with the law, have the
best chance to treat the underlying cause of the problem. In order to deal with
such sensitive issues, there must also be a sense of trust, a sense of respect,
and a sense of responsibility between the parties, especially the offender. To
reach this end, channels of communication must be opened, not closed; all
information relating to the individual must be considered, not rejected; and
most of all, all possible solutions and options must be included, not excluded.
Through such an approach, we can move beyond a purely adversarial and
confrontational method of resolving disputes-to the core of the issue-
confronting offenders with addictions.
The problem with the criminal system is that none of these strategies is
possible within its formal structure. The ability to communicate effectively
and meaningfully between and among individual parties is discouraged.
Parties are told when, how, and in what manner they can communicate. The
judge is constrained to be an objective observer instead of an active
interventionist. The dependence on lawyers quells the individual's voice and
prominence at the trial. The opportunity to work together and collaboratively
toward a common goal is replaced by a confrontational and adversarial form
of resolving disputes and making decisions. Thus, this system displaces trust
and respect in favor of contempt and self-interest. The procedural rules of
evidence exclude, rather than include, much information that may be quite
pertinent to an individual's personal or familial situation. The rules of
discovery allow only certain relevant information to be revealed to the
opposing party. It is clearly evident that these procedural and communicative
barriers force a narrowing, rather than expansive, view of the adjudicatory
process. Most of all, avenues for resolution in crimes of addiction is
constricted toward only one end: punishment. Recidivism rates have
demonstrated that punishment is utterly ineffective in the cases involving
crimes of addiction because it never addresses the substance abuse problems
that underlie the criminal act. It is clear that the traditional trial structure
ignores and rejects the very elements that are necessary to effectively deal
with the challenges presented by these criminal offenders. These problems
would be mitigated to some degree if the judge, at the very least, was free to
engage in creative decision-making. However, for the most part, she is not.
356
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2. In the Criminal Courts, the Judge Is Accorded Minimal
Flexibility to Fashion Solutions That Address the Causes
Underlying Crimes of Addiction
Although lack of communication and collaboration has significant
drawbacks, this could be mitigated to some degree for offenders with
addictions if the decision-maker in the criminal court was afforded a
significant degree of flexibility in the decision-making process.
Unfortunately, the judge is as equally constrained as the parties. As stated
above, the doctrine of stare decisis "is intended to produce consistent results
in similar cases, and anomalous results can be subjected to appellate
review." 137 Thus, when a judge is appointed, she implicitly agrees to apply
existing legal principles. 138 The judge is not merely constrained doctrinally
in her ability to exercise discretion and flexibility. The court structure
perpetuates a mechanical, "apply the rules" type of judge because "the
repetitive nature of their caseloads disposes judges to perceive a case not in
terms of parties in dispute, but in terms of legal and factual issues
presented ... .,,139 Consequently, the administration of justice represents an
impersonal endeavor, where legal precedence serves to significantly reduce
judicial flexibility, thereby restraining judges from searching for creative,
responsive, and plausible solutions that respond to the individual, not merely
the criminal act.
The problem with this in the criminal system is that precedence,
tradition, and judicial commitment focus almost entirely on incarceration as
the primary response to crimes of addiction instead of treatment. If the judge
"does her job" by adhering to previously established legal rules, she will be
forced to utilize judicial responses to addicted offenders-responses that are
proven failures. In this way, the judge is legally constrained, as her individual
role in the decision-making process is significantly reduced. Thus, the judge
is inevitably thrust into a proverbial "Catch 22." If she simply punishes the
addicted offender, she will essentially be engaging in an exercise in futility,
with minimal likelihood of reforming the offender. If she decides to reject
137 Delgado et al., supra note 115, at 1368 (emphasis added); see generally Owen
M. Fiss, Foreword: The Forms of Justice, The Supreme Court 1978 Term, 93 HARV. L.
REV. 1, 14 (1979) (discussing "[t]he task of a judge ... as giving meaning to our public
values and adjudication as the process through which that meaning is revealed or
elaborated.").
138 See Delgado et al., supra note 115, at 1368; see generally, John Thibaut &
Laurens Walker, A Theory of Procedure, 66 CAL. L. RuV. 541 (1978).
139 Delgado et al., supra note 115, at 1368.
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punishment and instead engage in solutions that address the addiction, she
will almost certainly face recrimination from the legislature (who often
prescribe sentencing guidelines), other judges, and the community itself.
Furthermore, because some crimes of addiction are often mandated by statute
to receive mandatory prison terms, the judge would face certain appellate
reversal. The massive caseloads that judges endure will also prevent judges
from truly engaging each offender and taking the time to fashion diverse
alternative solutions. The picture is quite clear: the judge is simply unable to
consistently explore solutions that address the substance abuse problems that
underlie many crimes of addiction.
Some critics may argue that predictability in judicial response is
beneficial because it allows parties to rely on the law. Individuals can
comport their conduct in congruity with established legal principles. This
argument does have force and in certain settings (i.e., contract law), the
predictability of the court system is certainly valuable and necessary.
However, in the case of crimes of addiction, predictability is useless because
it only refers the individual back to an outcome that is a total failure-
punishment. While it may be predictable that the courts will respond with
punishment, it is also equally as predictable that such remedy will not work
in the case of these offenders. Thus, the predictability and reliance argument
fails when it stems from a remedial source that is, in and of itself, ineffective
and nonresponsive to the issues presented by the addicted offender. The
desire to rely on a failed remedy represents a misplaced loyalty to legal
uniformity.
Critics may also assert that perpetrators of crimes of addiction actually
deserve punishment, and that alternative programs will fail to hold them
accountable for their behavior. The problem with this argument is that while
some may agree that crimes of addiction warrant punishment, the community
does not deserve a continued and perpetual threat in the neighborhood, which
is exactly what will result from the superficial apportionment of penal
sanctions. The recidivism rates tell the story-at the national level, over
seventy-five percent of these offenders are repeating the same crimes once
incarceration terminates. 140 This argument represents a classic tension
between moral imperatives and plausible objectives. Society may express
moral outrage at these crimes, thereby desiring imprisonment for crimes of
addiction based on a "just deserts" philosophy. Yet, society concomitantly
desires an eradication of this behavior and removal of this threat from the
community. Punishment may vindicate the former, but it fails in the latter. A
decision must be made as to which objective deserves more prominence. By
adopting an objective that fulfills the moral imperative, the criminal system
14 0 See Part I.A.
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is inherently perpetuating an insidious disease that threatens the entire
community. Thus, any claimed vindication on the part of the criminal system
is a mere abstraction. In reality, by not adopting a practical response to
addiction, the societal interest is left unfulfilled, because the criminal
courts-through punishment-inherently disregard the needs of both the
offender and of the community.
In sum, the criminal justice system presents both a problem of ends and
means when dealing with crimes of addiction. The ends of punishment are
truly an ineffective response because they never address the problem of
addiction that lies at the heart of crimes of addiction. High recidivism rates
are a logical consequence arising from the failure to resolve the underlying
cause. However, the ends do not tell the whole story. Because the criminal
courts are so constrained in their procedural and decision-making ability, the
formal means of the court both prevent alternative solutions and invariably
lead to a failed end for these offenders: punishment. When the courts tried
alternative solutions such as rehabilitation, they were a total failure because
the courts' formal paradigm and countless procedural protections do not
permit the kind of flexibility and in-depth assessment that a successful
rehabilitative solution would require.
As a result, there exists a two-pronged problem in attempting to develop
a successful judicial response to crimes of addiction. First, there must exist a
solution that works. (ends) in resolving the addictions that ignite these
criminal acts. Also, there must exist a forum (means) where this solution can
flourish, and where all factors necessary to successfully implement such a
solution operate. Only in this way can we respond to society's and the
victim's true practical interest in preventing these crimes and eradicating
addiction. The solution must first involve an ends inquiry, and the next
section proposes a well-known, and successful, solution to that problem.
IV. THE REHABILITATION MODEL, CRIMES OF ADDICTION, AND
ALTERNATiVE DisPum RESOLUTION MECHANISMS
Unlike retributivism, rehabilitation is currently a peripheral consideration
in our judicial infrastructure. It does not enjoy prominence in the criminal
courts, and its detractors are far more boisterous that its supporters. 141 Under
the rehabilitation model, the proper method to "reform" an offender is
through obtaining a thorough understanding of the external factors that may
underlie, and be responsible for, an individual's violation of the criminal
141 Gray Cavender & Michael C. Musheno, The Adoption and Implementation of
Determinate-Based Sanctioning Policies: A Critical Perspective, 17 GA. L. REV. 425,
426,441 (1983).
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code.142 As a result, consideration of social, economic, and even medical
factors are wholly relevant considerations in the rehabilitative calculus.' 43
This part examines the rehabilitative model, followed by a practical
examination of its application in an informal alternative dispute resolution
setting, namely the drug courts.
A. Rehabilitation and the "Curative" Ideal
Rehabilitation theory arose during the mid-1800s. 144 Simply stated,
proponents endorse a system that emphasizes treatment of the criminal
offender, not punishment. This view derives from the rehabilitationist's
premise that criminal behavior is primarily a product of "defective moral
training," not inherent sinfulness.' 45 This defectiveness is viewed as the by-
product of societal influences, not merely individual vice.146 The natural
corollary for rehabilitation advocates is to devise a system "of moral training
that would supposedly reduce the crime problem by instilling the proper
values in members of the criminal class." 147 Based on this ideology, the
rehabilitation advocate views the criminal offender as ill and in need of
treatment, not morally depraved and requiring punishment. 148
The proper aim of the penal system, then, is to reform the offender, with
the goal of transforming the morally deficient individual into a law-abiding,
contributing member of society. Earlier this century, a statement by the
Philadelphia Society for Alleviating the Miseries of Public Prisoners echoed
the rehabilitation sentiment:
142 See id. at 435-36. Cavender & Musheno note the following:
Judges began to consider such mitigating circumstances as age and background
before imposing sentences and in 1843 the first use of the insanity defense suggested
that some defendants were not legally responsible at all. Within prisons, programs
were developed around the goal of moral training, and incentives were employed to
encourage participation in those programs.
Id. at 435 (citations omitted).
143 See id.
144 Id. at 434.
145 Id. at 434-35. Cavender & Musheno explain, "[t]he depravity of the criminal
class was explained as a function of defective moral training, a by-product of rapid
urbanization and industrialization." Id. at 434.
146 See id. at 434.
147 Id. Cavender and Musheno state that this "explanation began to influence both
sentencing arrangements and penal strategies by the mid-1800's [sic]. In many cases, it
was simply inappropriate to hold a defendant fully responsible for a crime." Id. at 434-
35.
148 See Vitiello, supra note 28, at 1016-20.
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[T]he obligations of benevolence, which are founded on the precepts and
example of the Author of Christianity, are not canceled by the follies or
crimes of our fellow creatures .... By the aids of humanity.., such
degrees and modes of punishment may be discovered and suggested, as
may, instead of continuing habits of vice, become the means of restoring
our fellow creatures to virtue and happiness. 149
Thus, the rehabilitation model is inevitably one of social utility. 150
Rehabilitation theory endorses a forward-looking or consequentialist
approach, one that sees treatment not only for the individual, but also for the
preservation of the public welfare.15 1
B. Rehabilitation and Positivist Ideology
The rehabilitation ethic is further bolstered by the positivist ideology. 15 2
Under the positivist approach, "defective moral training" is only the initial
variable in realizing the factors that ignite criminal behavior. 153 Positivist
theory does not stop at the societal level in analyzing criminal behavior.
Positivists argue that criminal behavior, in addition to societal influences,
"[is] the product of factors over which the individual has little or no
control. '1 54 To support this notion, the positivist ideology cites factors such
as education, poverty, biological anomalies, and psychological factors as
relevant considerations that inhibit the individual's ability to make free,
volitional choices. 155 Proponents of the positivist school of thought believe
that the recognition of this reality should alter our approach to criminal
149 PHILADELPHIA SOCIETY FOR ALLEVIATING THE MISERIES OF PUBLIC PRISONS
CONST. pmbl., quoted in H. BARNES, THE EVOLUTION OF PENOLOGY IN PENNSYLVANIA
81, 82 (1968), reprinted in Carl E. Schneider, The Rise of Prisons and the Origins of the
Rehabilitative Ideal, 77 MICH. L. REV. 707, 727 (1979) (examining the origins and
historic backdrop of the rehabilitative model).
150 See Duff, supra note 9, at 4-12.
151 Id. at 5-6.
152 See Cavender & Musheno, supra note 141, at 435. Cavender and Musheno point
out that "[pjroponents of the view argued that factors could be identified through such
scientific techniques as experimentation and observation and that prison programs could
then be developed that would eliminate the problems and thereby reduce crime." Id.
15 3 Id.; see, e.g., SAMUAL E. STuMPF, SOCRATES TO SARTRE; A HISTORY OF
PHILOSOPHY (1966).
154 Cavender & Musheno, supra note 141, at 435.
155 See id.
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justice. 156 This alteration resurrects the call for rehabilitation, instead of
punishment, for the certain criminal offenders. 157 The positivist notion plays
an important role for the rehabilitation advocates, because it exposes
punishment as a potentially ineffective remedy in addressing the complex
factors that comprise criminal behavior.1 58 As we will see, the ethic of
rehabilitation and its positivist underpinnings have begun to permeate certain
alternative dispute mechanisms.
C. The Drug Courts: An Alternative Dispute Resolution
Mechanism That Successfully Utilizes Rehabilitation for
Crimes of Addiction
While the criminal system continues to utilize the retributivist model,
quasi-alternative dispute resolution mechanisms have attempted a different
approach: rehabilitation and treatment. Drug courts are paradigmatic
examples of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms that reject the
traditional punishment paradigm in adjudicating drug offenders. 159 In doing
so, the drug courts have discovered the promise of rehabilitation and
demonstrated the compatibility of utilizing rehabilitation in an alternative
dispute resolution forum. In this part, I examine the efficacy of three such
programs in New Jersey, Florida, and Oklahoma.
1. The New Jersey Experiment: A Success Story for Rehabilitation
In New Jersey, non-violent drug offenders are now diverted from the
traditional criminal process. In these cases, most participants plead guilty,
waive their right to a trial, and then embark on an ambitious alternative
treatment program.' 60 Subsequent to their guilty plea, drug offenders are
assigned to judges, prosecutors, public defenders, and treatment experts,
who, instead of punishment, design a plan of treatment and rehabilitation for
156 See id. Cavender & Musheno explain, "[t]he transition from a sanctioning policy
based on the concept of defective moral training to one based on rehabilitation
occurred... with the emergence of positivism." Id.
157 See id. ("Such an approach would, of course, be good for society but would
benefit the criminal as well."). In benefiting the criminal offender, we inherently benefit
society because once addiction is eradicated, the likelihood that the individual will repeat
the same crime substantially diminishes. Id.
158 See, e.g., id.
159 Carrie Johnson, Feds Fund New Drug Court, LEGAL TIMES, July 20, 1998, at 6.
160 Id.
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the offender. 161 Instead of working against each other, prosecutors, defense
lawyers, and even judges collaborate on the best method to lead an offender
onto the path of recovery. 162 Since its implementation in May 1997, more
than 300 adults have experienced New Jersey's Drug Treatment program in
lieu of the criminal courts. 163
The success of this program has been laudable in comparison to the
criminal courts. By implementing rehabilitation, these programs are
effectively reducing recidivism rates among drug offenders in New Jersey.
For example, a study conducted by the State Department of Corrections
found that the recidivism rate for drug offenders who were processed through
drug court was a mere twenty-three percent.164 In Essex County alone, of the
sixty adults who have gone through the drug treatment program, only one
individual has been charged with a new offense. 165 Conversely, the rate for
those offenders who were adjudicated through the traditional criminal
process and given prison terms was seventy percent-three times as high.166
At the national level, the recidivism rate for repeat offenders who are
161 Elizabeth Amon, Courts That Work on a Human Scale Drug-Offender
Diversionary Programs That Reward Success Rather Than Punish Failure Get Rave
Reviews from Veteran Lawyers, Judges, N.J. LJ., Aug. 24, 1998, at 1, available at WL,
153 N.J.L.J. 745. New Jersey's drug court program is still in'its early stages. In the
previous two years, over three hundred adult drug abusers have participated in New
Jersey drug courts. Approximately two hundred of the participants have experienced drug
court in Camden County, sixty in Essex County, and approximately sixty in Passaic
County. The prosecutor and defense attorney ultimately decide who will be enrolled in
the program. While it will take .some time to assess the success of the program, early
indications are that recidivism rates are lower than in the criminal courts. Furthermore,
the drug treatment program in New Jersey is intensive, which provides a safe-haven for
those officials who want to avoid being labeled "touchy-feely" for supporting this
program. Id.
162 Id. (noting how the respective roles of the participants are changing from an
adversary posture to one of collaboration).
163 Id. The drug courts are not entirely similar; many drug courts in New Jersey craft
their own programs. For example, in Camden and Essex County, the drug court is
primarily for non-violent drug offenders. In Hudson County, the drug court is primarily
designed for juvenile offenders. Id.
164 See Try Drug Treatment, supra note 83, at D12.
165 Although these statistics are not thorough enough to conclude that the drug court
in New Jersey is a success, they do represent a drastic divergence from the seventy
percent recidivism rate that is pronounced among offenders who are processed through
the criminal courts. See Amon, supra note 161, at 745.
166 See Try Drug Treatment, supra note 83, at D12.
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processed through the criminal courts is even higher-at seventy-seven
percent. 167
Furthermore, because of their success, the drug courts in New Jersey
have received the imprimatur of judges, prosecutors, and public defenders. 168
Assistant Deputy Public Defender Yvonne Segars suggests the drug courts is
"one of the best things that's happened in criminal jurisprudence in
decades." 169 Attorneys are also heralding the informal structure of the drug
courts. Essex County Prosecutor Joseph Donahue explains, "if you sat in one
of the meetings, I'm not sure you'd know who was the prosecutor and who
the public defender ... it's not in the true sense adversarial-we're not
playing our traditional roles." 170 Essex County Superior Court Judge Paul
Vichens also lauds the program, stating, "I don't speak through a lawyer. I
speak to the participants every week. We talk about problems and good
things happening in their lives." 171 The program is so popular with legal
personnel that one judge is even making house calls to monitor the status of
drug offenders in the program. 172
In addition, drug courts, as opposed to the criminal courts, are saving
New Jersey a significant amount of financial resources. While it costs ninety
dollars a day to keep a drug offender in jail, the cost at a treatment center
167 See Schmitt, supra note 86, at 4. Schmitt also examines an experiment conducted
at St. Francis Center For Addiction in Pittsburgh. This program invited 200 non-violent
drug offenders to experience treatment in lieu of incarceration. The offenders were
treated at an outpatient center for a period of six months, and the results were
astonishing-over ninety-three percent of these individuals completed treatment. This
study was conducted in comparison to 200 similar non-violent drug offenders who were
incarcerated. It was found that for these individuals, seventy percent of them were
eventually rearrested. Clearly, this study is compelling evidence of the success of the
drug courts in fighting the addiction problem. Id.
168 See Amon, supra note 161, at 745. One of the main reasons that this program is
receiving such high approbation is because of the flexibility it allows-judges and
lawyers are working together to collaborate on the best methods to treat a particular
offender. In this way, the adversary posture of decision-making is giving way to an
informal method of dispute resolution. Id.
169 Id.
170 Id. Part of the reason that the participants are not playing their adversarial roles is
because the offender has already pleaded guilty. The focus lies primarily on finding a
treatment plan that suits the individual offender. This type of "individualized" treatment
is a cornerstone of the rehabilitative model. Id.
171 Id. (Judge Stephen Thompson extols the program, stating that "it's the best thing
we've come up with yet." Essex County Prosecutor Joseph Donahue asserts, "it's a big
gamble what we're doing, but so far it seems to be paying off").
172 Id.
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ranges from forty-five to sixty-five dollars per day. 173 Bruce Stout, Governor
Whitman's senior policy advisor, confirms that it costs less to treat offenders
than to put them in prison. 174 Moreover, Assistant Attorney General Ronald
Susswein explains that "financial benefits are undeniable if savings from the
drop in recidivism are added to the revenue created when participants pay
taxes." 175
The program in New Jersey is successful because both the community
and the offender benefit from the reduction in drug activity. Whereas
criminal courts have been ineffective in reforming drug offenders, 176 the
drug courts are a proven-and hopefully lasting-success in eradicating the
offender's addiction. Ultimately, this benefits the community in two ways.
First, the public safety is enhanced through a reduction in drug activity and
drug-related crimes. Second, reformed offenders have the opportunity to
become productive members of their respective communities. As Susswein
states, "'You get better results, greater public safety, savings in tax payer
money,' and... 'if this breaks the cycle of addiction, what could be better
than that?"' 177 In New Jersey, drug courts, as an alternative dispute
resolution mechanism, are an undeniable success in part because of their
emphasis on rehabilitation, not retribution.
173 Try Drug Treatment, supra note 83, at D12. Thus, the community benefits in two
ways. First, there is a significant drop in the amount of resources needed to sustain an
addict in prison. Second, the drop in recidivism, which now stands at twenty-three
percent in New Jersey, contributes to overall community safety. Id.
174 Amon, supra note 161 (maintaining that "advocates say the programs are
reducing the turnstile traffic of drug addicted felons between the streets and jails, the
hallmark of the traditional criminal justice system").
175 Id.
176 This refers to the recidivism rates, which are three times as high when offenders
are processed through the criminal courts. See Try Drug Treatment, supra note 83; see
also Schmitt, supra note 86 (The national recidivism rate is seventy-seven percent for
drug offenders. In Fulton County, the recidivism rate was seventy percent for offenders
processed through the criminal courts. Conversely, it was thirty percent for those that
utilized drug courts.).
177 Amon, supra note 161, at 745. In part because of this success, President Clinton,
in 1998, ordered $800,000 in federal money to go to the New Jersey drug courts. Id.
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2. The Florida Initiative: Rehabilitation in Action
Since its inception in 1996, Florida drug courts are becoming primary
tools in the battle against drug addiction. 178 As in New Jersey, individuals
who are convicted of non-violent drug possession are now being diverted
from the traditional criminal courts in favor of Florida's drug court
paradigm. 179 The drug courts strive to alleviate the substance abuse problems
that afflict many offenders, and judges are granted increased discretion to
fashion programs that respond to the needs of individual participants. 180
Once an offender is accorded a treatment program, he undergoes regular
status hearings and counseling sessions that monitor the progress of the
respective offender. 181 Indeed, the supervision in the drug court program is
often more intensive than in the correctional system. 182As in New Jersey, by
alleviating the substance abuse problem, the drug courts in Florida are
significantly reducing the recidivism rate among these offenders. In Duval
County, Florida, the recidivism rate for drug offenders is an astonishing
0.7 %.183 Similarly, in Okaloosa County, Florida, the recidivism rate stands
at 6%.184 Furthermore, the drug treatment programs in Florida are assisting
in overall community safety. In a statewide study of Florida drug courts, less
than 20% of all participants were re-arrested for violent misdemeanor or
felony violations. 185 These accomplishments are astonishing in contrast to
the recidivism rates for offenders who did not undergo treatment for their
addiction. In Florida alone, the recidivism rate for offenders who go
178 See Pace, supra note 84, at 44. In fact, Florida was the first state to commence
the drug court idea. It was initiated by then Florida Attorney General Janet Reno in 1996.
Id.
179 See Schmitt, supra note 86, at 4. Schmitt also examines the drug court program
in Fulton County, Georgia. So far, Georgia has "graduated" 153 people from its drug
court program. Id.
180 See Killian, supra note 84, at 15. A report by the Florida Office of Drug Control
explained, "this flexibility not only allows greater control and participation in the
program at the local level, but it also promotes the judicial oversight that is essential for
program success." Id.
181 Id. (asserting that failure to scrupulously adhere to the parameters of the
treatment program can lead to implementation of sanctions).
182 Id.
183 Id.
184 Id. Due to this success, the report by the Office of Drug Control in Florida stated,
"given such demonstrated results, drug courts are assuming a greater role in the fight
against illegal drug abuse." Id.
185 Id.
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untreated through the drug courts is 70%.186 Clearly, this data demonstrates
that the rehabilitation model is a significant factor in Florida's successful
battle against crimes of addiction.
Florida drug courts are receiving widespread approbation because their
rehabilitative approach seeks to address the insidious addictions that underlie
these crimes. James R. McDonough, Director of the Florida Office of Drug
Control, supports utilization of the drug courts, "[w]hat they do is get to the
core of the problem."'1 87 This is especially important because many crimes. of
addiction are motivated by substance abuse problems. "[They either
committed the crime to get the drug or they were high on the drug when they
committed the crime." 188 McDonough explains that if drug treatment is not
embraced, "what happens is the average inmate gets out after forty-eight
months and goes right back to the culture he came from ... he is still an
addict, he still has those tendencies or cravings to go to drugs." 189 Because of
their success in fighting the addiction problem, Governor Jeb Bush has
endorsed the drug court effort, recently calling for greater expansion of the
drug courts in Florida's effort to reduce the 1.2 million drug users estimated
to exist in Florida. 190 The expansion of the drug courts and its widespread
support stem from the fact that they are getting results and eradicating a
problem that has consistently plagued the traditional courts.
In accomplishing these objectives, Florida is also saving a significant
amount of financial capital. Under Florida's drug courts, the average cost of
treating a drug defendant is approximately $1,800 per year.191 This figure
pales in comparison to the $26,000 it costs per year to keep an offender in
prison. 192 However, the savings in money represent only the beginning. By
rehabilitating addicted offenders, these individuals have the opportunity to
become contributing members of society. Drug Program Administrator Carl
Reeves contends, "if we get people clean and find them employment, they're
going to pay taxes instead of making us pay for them in the jails."'193 There
18 6 Id.
187 Id.
188 Id. This is evidence that the primary motivation driving commission of these
crimes is the substance abuse problems that plague these individuals. Id.
189 Id.
19 0 Id. Bush acknowledges that it will take a "continuous" effort to curb the drug
problem, but he plans to increase the utilization of drug courts in the fight against
substance abuse in Florida. Id.
191 Court Names Panel to Implement Supervised Drug Treatment Program, FLA. B.
NEWS, Sept. 1, 1998, at 26.
192 Id.
193 Schmitt, supra note 86, at 4.
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are now thirty-two drug courts in Florida, 194 and the plans for expansion
amount to a realization that rehabilitation is working, and through this, the
community, the state, and even the offender, are benefiting.
3. Rehabilitation in Oklahoma: An Emerging Success
Oklahoma has adopted an approach similar to New Jersey, as non-violent
drug-offenders are now being diverted to treatment programs in lieu of
punishment. Each drug court consists of a team that includes representatives
from law enforcement, judicial, and treatment fields. To qualify for the
program, offenders must plead guilty to their drug-related charges, waive the
right to a trial, sign a contract with the court, and agree to a treatment plan. 195
Once participants enter the program, they undergo frequent supervision by
the court. 196 As part of their negotiated pleas, participants must scrupulously
adhere to the treatment plan, or face prison terms. 197 Participants in the
program traditionally volunteer for the drug courts rather than experiencing
the criminal court system. 198
As in New Jersey and Florida, drug courts in Oklahoma are reducing the
recidivism rate. The drug court in Seminole County, Oklahoma celebrates
that 80% of drug court participants have not committed new crimes. 199 In
Pontotoc County, District Judge Tom Landrith similarly reports that 80% of
participants in their drug program have not committed new offenses.200
194 Killian, supra note 84, at 15 (conceding that despite these numbers, and the fact
that Florida has the second largest drug court in the nation, the Florida drug courts still
only reach a small number of the state's non-violent drug offenders).
195 Treatment-Based Courts, supra note 93. The treatment plans take a holistic
approach to rehabilitation, as programs range from substance abuse treatment to
vocational training to treatment of mental health problems. Id.
196 Judge Now a Believer, supra note 93 (noting that failure in these treatment
programs can result in imprisonment for an offender).
197 Treatment-Based Courts, supra note 93. The program in Oklahoma is only
available for non-violent drug abusers. As Judge Hill states, "drug addicts need help.
Drug dealers, however, need to be incarcerated." Id.
198 Jay Hughes, McCaffrey Attends First Graduation from Oklahoma County Drug
Court, ASSOCIATED PRESS NEWSwIRE, Aug. 14, 1999, at WL, 8/14/99 APWIRES
02:25:00 (reporting on Oklahoma's first "graduation" ceremony for drug court
graduates).
199 Treatment-Based Courts, supra note 93.
200 Id. Drug Court Judge Doug Haught details of one of his many cases, "When she
came to my court, she was testing positive for three different kinds of drugs. When she
left, she was clean." Ron Jackson, "Other Children" Get Second Chance, THE DAILY
OKLAHOMAN, Dec. 21, 1999, available at LEXIS, News Library, New Group File.
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Furthermore, District Judge Charles Hill asserts that the majority of offenders
who utilize drug court are eradicating their addictions and becoming
productive members of their communities. 201 By reducing recidivism, drug
courts seem to be offering a solution that eluded the retributivist minded
criminal courts.20 2 As Bronstad explains,
For years now, substance abuse offenders have been in a revolving door of
substance abuse, crime, incarceration, re-offense and re-incarceration.
These people continue to recycle through the system, because their
substance abuse problem is not being treated. Drug Courts are helping to
break that cycle, which ultimately benefits all of us.203
White House Drug Policy Director Barry McCaffrey agrees with the
rehabilitation approach of drug courts, concluding that "society benefits.. .by
giving non-violent drug offenders a second chance rather than jail time."204
Both participants and judges are heralding the success of the
rehabilitation-centered approach of the drug courts. Bronstad explains, "drug
courts aren't soft on crime, they're tough on addiction." 20 5 Judge Hill echoes
the drug courts' success in Oklahoma, maintaining that "they stop abusing
drugs, or whatever they are doing to support that addiction."206 Sandra
Bruner, a long-time drug abuser whose addiction was treated through the
drug courts, asserts, "this program has given me back my life.., if it was not
201 Judge Now a Believer, supra note 93; see Legal Beat, supra note 96. Judge Hill
explains, "they stop abusing drugs and doing whatever they were doing to support the
addiction-shoplifting, embezzling, forging prescriptions. They turn into productive
citizens, rather than being a burden to the state in prison." Judge Now a Believer, supra
note 93.202 See Hughes, supra note 198 (maintaining that the reduction in recidivism rates is
clear evidence that drug courts offer an effective alternative to criminal courts, and as
McCaffrey states, "[t]he drug court system is not magic, but it is the best things we've
found so far to deal with it").
203 Treatment-Based Courts, supra note 93. Judge Landridth agrees with Bronstad,
suggesting that, "I knew what we were doing wasn't working." Judge Now a Believer,
supra note 93.
204 Hughes, supra note 198.
205 Treatment-Based Courts, supra note 93. Judge Hill explains, "[i]f they
flunk... they are sanctioned immediately. Sanctions may range from additional
community service or support group meetings, to jail time." Judge Now a Believer, supra
note 93.
206 Id.
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for this program, I would either be dead or in the penitentiary.'20 7 Kay
Allen, Director of Youth and Financial Services suggests that as a result of
drug courts, "we see ... individuals and families who are starting to get help,
people who otherwise wouldn't ask for help. '20 8 Oklahoma District Judge
Doug Haught echoes this enthusiasm, declaring that the drug court "is very
rewarding... [w]hen these kids succeed, we clap and cheer.., it's worth it
because it's personally rewarding. '209
Like the drug courts in New Jersey and Florida, the Oklahoma initiative
is saving taxpayers a significant amount of financial resources.210 State Drug
Court planner JoAnn Bronstad explains that, "not only are we helping certain
offenders ... but we are also saving the state millions of dollars that won't
have to be spent on incarcerating non-violent offenders. ' 211 While it costs the
state $15,000 a year to keep someone in prison, the average cost of treating
addiction is only $2,800 per year. 212 In Oklahoma County alone, the drug
court has saved the -county almost $1.9 million in less than a year.213
McCaffrey re-enforces this sentiment, stating that "the first thing you do is
save the cost to the prison system."214
The rise, and subsequent success of drug courts, is not surprising because
it focuses on the substance abuse problems that lie at the heart of crimes of
207 Hughes, supra note 198 ("[T]here are thousands of people like myself who want
to quit living a life of addiction but don't know how to go about it."). The drug courts
seem to be providing an effective solution. Id.
208 Jackson, supra note 200.
209 Id. The Drug Court is personally rewarding for judges like Haught because they
have fostered personal relationships with many of the participants in the program. Haught
has framed photographs of offenders who were rehabilitated through the system in his
office. In many photos the judge is pictured with his arms around the individuals, after
successful completion of the program. He notes, "I think the drug court[s] [are]
necessary... I wouldn't take money for it... it's worth it because it's personally
rewarding." Id.
210 Treatment-Based Courts, supra note 93. By all indications, Oklahoma and New
Jersey are not anomalous. Although data is scarce, "[a]ll indications are that the cost of
shepherding someone through a drug court is a fraction of the cost of maintaining the
same person in a prison cell." Pace, supra note 84, at 44.
211 Treatment-Based Courts, supra note 93.
212 Judge Now a Believer, supra note 93.
213 Hughes, supra note 198.
214 Id. The financial rewards are not only in the form of prison savings, but in health
care costs, accidents, and lost wages. See Barbara Hoberock, Drug Czar Attends OC
Drug Court Graduation, 12 TULSA WORLD, Aug. 14, 1999, at 12, available at 1999 WL
5410250.
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addiction.215 The success of the drug courts has spawned the proliferation of
drug courts nationwide. 216 These courts have accomplished what the
retributivist-driven criminal courts could not-a reduction in recidivism,
judicial costs, and consequently, safer communities.217 In contrast to their
counterparts in the criminal courts, New York drug courts boast a 75%
graduation rate and mere 20% recidivism rate. In Pittsburgh, drug courts
have reduced recidivism rates to less than 33%. A recent study confirmed
these results, stating that only 10 to 33% of drug court graduates are re-
arrested for new offenses. 218 Contrast this with the 77% recidivism rate
among those processed through the traditional courts, and the drug courts
have clearly shown that, for certain crimes of addiction, rehabilitation, not
punishment is the best solution in our effort to reform these offenders.
Accordingly, the drug courts have made a believer out of many who had
formerly endorsed retributivism. Judge Hill declares, "I firmly believed in
locking them up... but that just does not work The drug court is the only
program I've seen that works."219 McCaffrey likewise hails drug courts as
"the best thing we've got so far to deal with it.' '220 Clinical Psychologist Dr.
Normann Hoffman explains, "Drug Court is probably the best chance at
abstinence for many abusers." 221 Through this approach, drug courts not
only restored the rehabilitative ideal, but also have affirmatively shown that
in certain settings, punishment is a wholly ineffective end for dealing
effectively with crimes of addiction.
215 This is based on reduced recidivism rates, lower costs, and overall enthusiasm
among those involved with the drug courts.
216 See Hoberock, supra note 214, at 12. Drug courts are operational in eleven
counties in Oklahoma, and there are about 600 drug courts across the country. Moreover,
President Clinton has recently announced the release of $32 million for drug courts
nationwide. Amon, supra note 161, at 745.
217 Schmitt, supra note 86, at 4. The success of the program has made a believer out
of Judge Stanley M. Goldstein, Circuit Judge in Florida. He explains of the drug courts,
"It sounded impossible to me .... I saw what crack cocaine did to people, and I didn't
believe you could get anybody off it .... I still wasn't convinced until... people started
coming in with clean shirts and dress pants, and I thought, where did these people come
from?" Id.
218 Pace, supra note 84, at 44.
2 19 Judge Now a Believer, supra note 93 (emphasis added). Judge Hill explains, "the
majority of the offenders regain their self-esteem, and are accepted again back into their
families and communities." Id.
220 Hughes, supra note 198.
221 Schmitt, supra note 86, at 4. Hoffmann explains, "(ilt provides them with a
structure and accountability that a standard treatment center would not be capable of
imposing."
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Drug courts have fashioned a successful solution to the ends part of our
inquiry. They have clearly shown the efficacy of rehabilitation in dealing
with one category of crimes of addiction. Drug courts have shown that when
the traditional criminal courts attempted to utilize rehabilitation, the end itself
was not the problem, rather, the traditional, formal adjudicatory means in
which rehabilitation was administered represented the problem. Accordingly,
the second aspect of this inquiry commences by searching for a means
solution where rehabilitation, and the attendant elements necessary to impart
such a solution, can flourish. This is especially important considering that
there exist additional crimes of addiction that require adjudication within the
rehabilitative methodology. 222 Thus, the question of means is particularly
crucial because no theory, no matter how noble, can be successful unless it
exists in a forum conducive to its implementation. The solution to this
dilemma lies in the forum of court sponsored mediation.
V. UTILIZING COURT-SPONSORED MEDIATION TO ADJUDICATE
CRIMES OF ADDICTION: A NOVEL APPROACH
The utilization of court-sponsored mediation can represent a novel, yet
effective, means by which we adjudicate crimes of addiction. Before we
examine in-depth the plausibility of utilizing mediation, it is important to
introduce the specific parameters of this alternative program. Pursuant to this
alternative mediation program, an individual who is arrested and charged
with an offense would first be required to plead guilty to his victimless
offense and volunteer for court sponsored mediation. 223 This would be the
individual's only contact with the criminal court. The reason for such a
requirement is based on the fact that any attempts at rehabilitation would be
thwarted unless the offender, at the outset, acknowledged the wrongdoing in
his action and the inherent necessity for treatment. Also, at the pleading
stage, the offender would be entitled to the full panoply of procedural
safeguards, in order to ensure an informed decision on his part. Once the
222 Offenses such as DWI, DUI, and public intoxication are crimes of addiction that
require treatment, not punishment. Furthermore, alcohol related offenses occur with such
regularity that a rehabilitative solution would be especially timely. For example, in 1998,
in New Jersey alone, over 500,000 individuals were arrested for DWI. Yost, supra note
82. It would be improbable for the drug courts to expand their services to adjudicate these
individuals. Also, many states still do not have drug courts, and drug courts are not the
only alternative forum where the rehabilitative approach can be successfully
administered. See discussion infra Part V.
223 Since the success of mediation depends on the individual's effort, it is important
that the individual have the desire to participate in the program. This will ensure that the
individual is at least somewhat committed to rehabilitation and recovery.
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offender has pleaded guilty, he would be diverted from the criminal courts
into a mediation program that, after careful and thorough examination of the
offender, would place this individual into a treatment program that aims to
treat the addiction, not merely punish the offense. There is one caveat to such
a program: the ability of the individual to avoid prison or further detainment
shall be contingent upon his successful completion of the program. To assist
in completion, there will also need to be continued supervision and
monitoring after the completion of a specified program. The rationale behind
such an approach is that if the individual fails or shows little initiative to cure
his illness, then the threat to society remains, in which case incarceration or
further rehabilitative efforts may be necessary.
The success of such a program will depend heavily on the characteristics
and structure of mediation itself. Because of its informal paradigm,
mediation can be an effective alternative forum for adjudicating crimes of
addiction. If successfully and carefully used, mediation can exist as the
mechanism that vindicates the societal interest in seeing this behavior
eradicated. Mediation will adopt a response that has proven successful in
reforming perpetrators of crimes of addiction: rehabilitation and treatment.224
In doing so, mediation can act as a conduit for the resurrection of
rehabilitation and the restoration of the community. Unlike the criminal
courts, the characteristics that comprise mediation are most conducive to
achievement of this objective.
A. Mediation's Informal Procedures Make It More Conducive for
Implementing the Rehabilitative Model
Mediation represents "a consensual process in which a neutral third
party, without any power to impose a resolution, works with the disputing
parties to help them reach a mutually acceptable resolution of some or all of
the issues in dispute." 225 Mediation would be ideally suited to deal with
crimes of addiction because it adopts an informal posture of decision making.
Mediation eliminates many formalities that are cornerstones of the traditional
judicial process. For example, the rules of evidence and discovery usually do
not apply.226 In some cases, the right to counsel is not required, and
224 Ile drug courts exemplify the success of rehabilitation.
225 Stephanie A. Beauregard, Court-Connected Juvenile Victim-Offender Mediation:
An Appealing Alternative for Ohio's Juvenile Delinquents, 13 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP.
RESOL. 1005, 1011 (1998) (examining the efficacy of juvenile offender mediation
programs in several Ohio counties).
2 26 Delgado et al., supra note 115, at 1366.
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adherence to substantive legal principles is relaxed.2 27 In essence,
mediation's structure consists of a series of de-formalized, de-centralized
procedures that are aimed at substantive resolution of problems rather than
loyalty to procedural niceties.228 It is these very procedures that allow
mediation to adopt rehabilitative solutions that the drug courts have shown
present a genuine chance to reform offenders with addictions.
1. Mediation Allows the Adjudicator a Significant Degree of
Procedural and Legal Flexibility
Mediators are afforded a significant degree of latitude to assume
different roles in facilitating discourse among the parties involved.2 29 As
Levi explains, mediators "may take on numerous roles facilitating
communications between parties and in seeking solutions." 230 The role of the
mediator can has been characterized in many ways, from that of a "process
facilitator,"231 a "resource expander," 232 a "trainer,' 233 a "problem
explorer,"234 and most importantly, a "leader." 235 Levi highlights these
differing roles, explaining that "a mediator may act as a guardian of
discipline ... as a confidential advisor... or as a consultant charged with
generating creative, mutually beneficial solutions." 236 Furthermore, some
mediators meet individually with each side of a dispute.237 Clearly, these
descriptions highlight the notion that mediation affords flexibility to
adjudicators that does not inhere to judges in the traditional trial process.
The flexibility afforded to mediators is especially beneficial for crimes of
addiction, because it affords the mediator the opportunity to become an
active participator, not a passive bystander. Individuals who commit crimes
of addiction, such as drug or alcohol abusers, can not have their illness
eradicated in prison because prison abandons treatment alternatives.
However, if we divert these individuals into an informal mediation paradigm,
the mediator will have the opportunity to engage the individual's problem, to
227 Id.
228 Id.
229 Levi, supra note 130, at 1169.
230 Id.
231 CDR Associates, CENTER FOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION, MEDIATION 1 (1989).
232 Levi, supra note 130, at 1169-70 n.1 10.
233 Id.
234 Id.
235 Id.
236 Id. at 1169.
237 Id. at 1169-70.
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engage in creative solutions that will address the cause, not merely the
effects, of the problem. As Stipanowich explains, "[s]olutions are limited
only by the imagination and willingness of... the mediator."238 Unlike the
criminal court, the mediator will not be forced to apportion punishment to an
individual knowing that such a response would be wholly ineffective in
treating the problem. Instead, by having the opportunity to search for creative
resolutions, the adjudicator will be able to entertain remedies that work, such
as rehabilitation or treatment programs. In this way, our system would be
adopting responses that provide an optimal chance for alleviating the
addiction and thereby reforming the offender. In the traditional court
paradigm the judge would have no such flexibility, and thus would not have
the opportunity to explore in depth the problem that led an offender to violate
the law. The informality of mediation makes such an approach possible.
In addition, flexibility and discretion, the hallmarks of mediation's
informality, will be enhanced because mediation relaxes adherence to both
substantive and legal principles.239 Simply stated, the fact that a mediator is
free to entertain novel solutions will have reduced efficacy if the mediator
would nonetheless be constrained by substantive and procedural rules of law.
Instead, because of the de-emphasis on legal mores, the mediator will not be
bound by the stringent constraints of legality, leaving him free to come up
with creative solutions without constantly feeling that he may be in
contravention of the law. This approach avoids the "Catch-22" dilemma of
the traditional courts, where a judge is often faced with "all or nothing"
decisions that, based on precedent, necessitate a particular outcome. 240 This
can lead to decisions that, while legally correct, are not truly in the best
interest of the offender or society. Conversely, under the informality rubric,
the mediator will be free to engage in creative solutions, such as diversion to
treatment programs, while the criminal court would be constrained to fewer
options.241  As Delgado explains, "modem rules of procedure
reduce... options... [in ADR] the inquiry is wide ranging."242 Adherence
to legal precedence will not be the only source to which the mediator can
refer in making such a decision. Principles of community values, mutual
238 Thomas J. Stipanowich, The Quiet Revolution Comes to Kentucky: A Case Study
in Community Mediation, 81 KY. L.J. 855, 871 (1993) (studying the effects of a
community based mediation program in Kentucky).
239 See generally Delgado et al., supra note 115, at 1366.
240 Id. at 1367. By "all or nothing" outcomes, I am referring to situations in which,
via case law or statute, the judge is required to render a ruling that may not be in the best
interests of the parties. In these situations, the law can have a constraining effect. Id.
241 See generally id.
242 Id. at 1374.
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understanding, compromise, and increased discretion will allow the mediator
more latitude in making an informed and personalized judgment. Viewing
the process as one that strives for rehabilitation and restoration of the
offender back into the community, the best interest of the parties and society,
not legal strictures, will control the day.
Some may argue that a system, which dispenses in part with procedural
and substantive law, fails to afford adequate protection to the rights of an
individual. 243 For example, many would argue that in such a system, those
who have more resources might be more inclined to oppress the weaker
party.244 Such a criticism is valid only on the presupposition that there is a
gross disparity in both power and interest. In these situations, while
prosecutors may have unlimited resources and access to legal expertise, their
singular interest in incarceration may be somewhat diminished based on the
failure of incarceration, coupled with the promise of rehabilitation as a
method to alleviate this behavior. Furthermore, without a victim in the
traditional sense, the pressure on the prosecutor purely to punish an offender
is not as heightened. Coupled with the proven success of using rehabilitation
in the drug courts, prosecutors may not be adverse to the proposition of
utilizing mediation to explore treatment alternatives. As Essex County
Prosecutor Joseph Donahue explains, "[i]t's a big gamble what we're doing,
but so far it seems to be paying off...,"245 Absent a pure aversion to the
remedial alternative, the interest of both sides can be similar because the
objective has proven successful in the drug courts-that of rehabilitation and
treatment for the addicted offender. As a result, the necessity of increased
protections will be diminished because the two sides will be working for, and
not against, the offender.
The fact that the offender will already have pleaded guilty will further
diminish the danger of emasculating procedural safeguards. This is true
because the prosecutors, despite the fact that there is no traditional victim,
have the interest and desire to send an important message by securing these
convictions. By requiring a plea of guilty, the prosecutor's primary interest in
securing a conviction will already be served and vindicated before the
commencement of mediation proceedings. The process of finding a
rehabilitative solution will be separate from, and subsequent to, the
determination of an offencler's guilt. This highlights the important benefit of
mediation; namely, that the search for a solution is not entangled with the
adjudication of guilt or innocence itself. Since adjudication of guilt comes
before the commencement of mediation proceedings, the only issue left for
243 See Stipanowich, supra note 238, at 873.
244 See id.
245 Amon, supra note 161, at 745.
[Vol. 16:2 2001]
REACHING ACROSS LEGAL BOUNDARIES
the prosecutor will be whether the remedy of rehabilitation is acceptable in
lieu of prison. As stated above, the proven success of institutions such as the
drug courts, coupled with the ineffectiveness of prison,24 may diminish the
prosecutorial interest in incarceration, enhancing the prospect of
rehabilitation.
Even if the mediator employs a rehabilitative solution, the offender's
ability to avoid incarceration is nonetheless contingent upon the successful
completion or graduation from the program. Incarceration, upon the failure
of an individual to successfully complete a treatment program, remains an
alternative for the, prosecutor and the mediator. As a result, even if the
prosecutor opposes rehabilitation, he may be less inclined to object, knowing
that incarceration or other remedies remain as alternatives should initial or
subsequent rehabilitative efforts fail. In a way, the prosecutor gets the best of
both worlds-he can agree to a novel solution that has already proven
successful in many states via the drug courts, and if unsuccessful, there is
still the option of incarceration if further rehabilitation options are rejected.
Because of these mechanisms, there is a strong likelihood that prosecutors
will have a diminished interest in taking advantage of procedural laxity. With
the decrease in interest, there will be minimal desire for oppression.
The need for procedural safeguards is less important because the focus of
the mediation is on generating a solution to help the offender's re-inculcation
back into the community, not on, for example, deprivation of liberty at a trial.
In a trial where guilt or innocence is at issue, procedural safeguards prevent
the prosecutor from introducing illegally obtained evidence, or evidence that,
while relevant, may be unreliable, such as hearsay.247 These procedural
safeguards are meant to protect the constitutional rights of the accused,
credibility of evidence, accurate fact-finding, and to ensure fundamental
fairness But this is primarily relevant and useful only at the trial stage where
liberty is at stake, not after it has ended and guilt been decided. As a result,
the emphasis on procedural rights, in a mediation setting that searches for a
rehabilitative solution only after the guilt determination, is misguided. Strict
adherence to procedural safeguards will thwart the attempt to find a creative
solution, because it will permit the parties to endlessly assert their "rights"
instead of accepting responsibility and seeking a plausible solution.
Accordingly, there is little reason to believe that procedural laxity will
produce oppression.
246 See supra Part ITH.
247 Hearsay evidence is inadmissible at trial primarily because it lacks the indicia of
reliability for admissible evidence and, in some circumstances, because of the
defendant's Sixth Amendment right to confrontation of witnesses. See FED. R. EvID. 801.
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
The latter point is crucial because when implementation of rehabilitation
was attempted by the criminal courts, rehabilitation failed not because the
ends were ineffectual, but because the means were not conducive to
successful achievement of the ends. The failure of rehabilitation in the
criminal courts was due in large part to the incompatibility of formality and
reformative jurisprudence. Part of this formality lies in procedural
constraints, and in this way, procedure can serve to hinder, not help, both the
offender and community in finding rehabilitative solutions. This, along with
the previous discussion, illustrates that procedural necessities depend on
context-on what type of proceeding the person is engaged in and what type
of end is ultimately sought. Since the addicted offender retains all procedural
safeguards at the time he decides to plead guilty, these principles are never
compromised, as mediation occurs ex-post facto. Thus, the argument for
procedural compromise is ultimately misplaced because it disregards the
context and place at which mediation is initiated and the ends it seeks.
The varied roles that mediators can play, coupled with the relaxation of
legal principles, create a structure where rehabilitation has a true possibility
of becoming a reality. While the criminal courts seek to punish crimes of
addiction, the deference afforded mediators will permit an increased
exploration of issues and alternatives. In this situation, rehabilitation can
flourish and become a predominant method for adjudicating crimes of
addiction. The flexibility afforded to participants must not be one-sided,
affording only the mediator flexibility. Instead, the only method by which
mediation and rehabilitation can be successful for the offender is if
participants are involved and openly communicating about potential
solutions. Indeed, mediation is structured to promote this atmosphere.
2. The Structure of Mediation Permits Open Colloquy and
Collaboration Among the Parties
Mediation not only affords the mediator an increased flexibility in the
decision-making process, but it also provides the opportunity for open and
candid colloquy among all parties, including the offender. The same is not
true in traditional adjudication, where procedural niceties and stringent
formality exist as a barrier to effective discourse regarding an individual's
addiction. Judith Resnik, Professor of Law at New York University, explains,
"[t]he formality of adjudication is perceived as undermining open
communication." 248 Mediation takes a different approach, where informality
encourages open candor among the parties. As Stipanowich explains,
"[i]nstead of providing guideposts for settlement by approximating or
248 Resnik, supra note 114, at 249.
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predicting an adjudicated outcome... mediation allows parties to candidly
express, in a private setting, the concerns that brought them to the
table ... " ,249 Thus, unlike the criminal courts, mediation can "take[] into
account expressions that might be considered [']irrelevant[']to
adjudication .... -250 The practical effect is that mediation's informality
exists to give the offender a voice in the proceeding, which seems
appropriate considering that the very purpose of the forum is to generate an
effective solution that will lead the individual onto the path of recovery.
This is especially beneficial because with increased communication
comes a heightened sense of cooperation and collaboration. In describing
mediation processes, Stipanowich explains, "[m]ore than any other
procedure, mediation seeks to supplant the adversary mindset of pretrial and
trial practice with a perspective of cooperation and mutual betterment." 251
Resnik concurs with this proposition, explaining of ADR that "[c]onversation
and cooperation replace conflict .... ,"252 By fostering a climate of open
communication and collaborative participation, mediation can inherently
produce an increased sense of respect among the parties. As Levi explains in
her article, "mediation's strength [is] its ability to transform
relationships ... by empowering individuals and encouraging mutual respect
among parties. '253 The clear benefit from these propositions lie in the fact
that through creation of intimate relationships, the parties can work together,
not against each other, and work with the mediator "toward a creative
resolution of their dispute.... "254 By working together, the possibility that
parties will fashion a mutually acceptable and beneficial solution will be
enhanced.
This is especially true because effective collaboration serves an enabling
function, allowing parties to explore an individual's illness in an in-depth
manner. Stipanowich highlights this benefit, explaining that "[t]he potential
result is a collaborative exploration of all sorts of issues-not just those with
249 Stipanowich, supra note 238, at 870.
250 Levi, supra note 130, at 1170.
251 Stipanowich, supra note 238, at 870.
252 Resnik, supra note 114, at 249 (citing Lucy V. Katz, Compulsory Alternative
Dispute Resolution and Voluntarism: Two-Headed Monster or Two Sides of the Coin?,
1993 J. DisP. RESOL. 1 (1993)).
253 Levi, supra note 130, at 1170 (citing ROBERT A. BARLICH BUSH & JOSEPH P.
FOLGER, THE PROMISE OF MEDIATION: RESPONDING TO CONFLICT THROUGH
EMPOWERMENT AND RECOGNITION 20-21 (1994)).
254 Delgado et al., supra note 115, at 1367 (citing Robert B. McKay, Civil Litigation
and the Public Interest, 31 U. KAN. L. REV. 355, 369 (1983)).
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legal labels-and a solution that reaches beyond judicial remedies."25 5 Such
exploration is not possible in the traditional courts, where formality tends to
avoid getting to the heart of the issue. As Judge Jack Etheridge, a veteran of
the traditional court system, explains of the courts, "[suits], countersuits,
third-party practice, as well as the usual plethora of motions... are almost
always contrived-and not at the heart of the real dispute. Mediation,
skillfully handled, avoids masking the real issues."256 The ability to work
together effectively serves to benefit the offender because it allows an
incisive probing of the causes of a respective dispute, which often run deep
and are difficult to ascertain. By exploring the root of the individual's
problem, there is a better chance that participants can arrive at results that
address and respond to the offender's illness, instead of only superficially
condemning its results.
Mediation's ability to foster a sense of "working together" to
collaboratively explore a problem will enhance the likelihood of success
because it will create a feeling of responsibility and obligation among the
parties.2 57 For example, in a study of small claims disputes, Levi explains
that "the consensual nature of mediated settlements resulted in a greater
likelihood that parties... would abide by... agreements as compared with
court judgments. '258 As Professors Craig McEwen and Richard Maiman
explain, mediation fosters discussions "of general moral and interpersonal
obligations as well as legal obligations," which "activate[ ] [a] sense of
responsibility" in the parties.259 Most importantly, by working together with
a sense of mutual obligation and cooperation, "mediation makes it more
likely that they will find the result acceptable."2 60 This is a crucial factor
because in a setting where successful rehabilitation depends on the individual
offender, finding an acceptable solution becomes most important.
255 Stipanowich, supra note 238, at 870-71 (citing Jack Etheridge, Mending Fences:
Mediation in the Community, TRIAL, Oct. 31, 1985, at 33).
256 Id. at 870-71 n.104 (emphasis added).
257 See Levi, supra note 130, at 1171 ("According to some advocates of mediation,
the emphasis on communication and voluntariness renders mediation more likely to
resolve disputes than adversarial style litigation.").
2 5 8 Id. (citing CRAIG A. MCEWEN & RICHARD J. MAIMAN, MEDIATION IN SMALL
CLAIMS COURT: CONSENSUAL PROCESSES AND OUTCOMES, IN MEDIATION AND
RESEARCH: THE PROCESS AND EFFECTIVENESS OF THIRD-PARTY INTERVENTION 53, 60
(1989)).
259 Id.
260 Stipanowich, supra note 238, at 871 (citing Craig A. McEwen & Richard J.
Maiman, Small Claims Mediation in Maine: An Empirical Assessment, 33 ME. L. REV.
237,238-39 (1987)).
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Based on the foregoing discussion, it is readily apparent how the
informal structure of mediation could provide the maximal opportunity for
successful resolution of crimes of addiction. Since the success of this
alternative rehabilitation program depends on the individual offender, it is
crucial to involve the offender in the process. Since mediation, by its
structure, encourages this very involvement, it, rather than the criminal
courts, is best suited for crimes of addiction.
Mediation fosters a climate of candid communication and creates a sense
of egalitarianism with the offender. In the criminal courts, the offender is
normally a passive bystander, ignorant of the legal dynamics of a case, and
dependent on his lawyer to represent his voice. This all changes in a
mediation forum, where the voice of the offender takes center stage, and
where the offender becomes an integral participator in actively searching for
a mutually beneficial resolution. The individual may discuss family
circumstances, personal relationships, or previous events that shed light on
his dependence on illegal substances. In mediation, the offender has the
chance to speak of personal issues, that while important to him, would never
have been heard in a criminal setting. While this may be "irrelevant" in trials,
it is relevant here, as the offender is free to offer suggestions about the most
optimal path toward rehabilitation. In essence, the offender does not just
represent a problem that needs to be solved, but the offender becomes a
problem solver, active in communicating his input. By being involved and
informed, the individual will become empowered, believing not only that he
can have a voice, but that his voice matters, that his voice is not subordinate
to others, and that his is, in essence, part of the search for the solution.261
However, merely letting the offender take part in finding a solution most
optimal for rehabilitation will not solve the problem. The offender still
requires helpful guidance on the path to rehabilitation. This is where
mediation's emphasis on cooperation and non-adversarial negotiating will
prove most beneficial. While the offender may be inclined to discuss matters
about his personal circumstances, others, such as the mediator, and even the
prosecutor, will assist the individual by offering pragmatic solutions,
providing information, and using their expertise to suggest appropriate
resolutions consonant with the offender's circumstances. Like the drug
courts, the adversarial process will be replaced with "teams
of... prosecutors, defense lawyers, and treatment experts who collaborate
261 Katherine L. Joseph, Note, Victim-Offender Mediation: What Social and
Political Factors Will Affect Its Development?, 11 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 207, 212-
13 (1996). Contra Richard Delgado, Prosecuting Violence: A Colloquy on Race,
Community, and Justice, 52 STAN. L. REV. 751,763 (2000).
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
on the best way to put offenders on the right track." 262 By transcending
adversarial roles, polarized sides can come together and work toward a
common goal. The parties can then focus more effectively on the needs of
their clients.263 This is important because when the offender sees that people
around him are committed to addressing the addiction, and not merely
punishing him, it will ignite the individual's self-worth. Judge Isaac Jenrette
explains, "someone in such a position taking an interest can give participants
a confidence boost. '264 The offender can see the process as beneficial for,
and not detrimental to, his best interest. Accomplishing this goal is crucial
considering that, as stated, the success of the endeavor depends so much on
the effort of the offender.
Cooperation can also enhance the potential success of the endeavor
because dealing with addiction and substance abuse requires in-depth
exploration, something mediation, not the courts, can provide. Indeed,
substance abuse is an illness that cannot be dealt with in a cursory fashion. It
is not an ailment that burgeons overnight, and it does not happen without
cause. There are reasons, sometimes very deep, personal, and sensitive, that
drive a person to drink excessively or use drugs. Only by exploring this
causal relationship can we fashion a tenable solution that responds to causes,
not simply effects. When speaking of rehabilitation in the drug courts, Drug
Control Officer James McDonough explained, "[w]hat they do is get to the
core of the problem. ' 265 One individual may require weekly AA meetings,
while another may require more serious rehabilitative efforts, such as
hospitalization or residential treatment. But it is difficult to fashion a
successful solution without examining these issues, something the criminal
courts make no effort to accomplish. In the criminal courts, probation or
short prison terms represent the superficial manner in which crimes of
addiction are adjudicated. Much more than this is required, and mediation's
structure affords the chance for real discussion about addiction, about
sensitive issues that need to surface on the path to rehabilitation. In this way,
262 Amon, supra note 161, at 745. Judge Paul Vichness was reluctant to endorse this
approach by the drug courts, but the experience made him a believer in its success. Amon
explains of Judge Vichness, "[h]e recently began a program of enlisting drug court
graduates to teach current enrollees how to deal with the stress of quitting drugs and
avoiding temptations that lead to relapse." Id.
263 See Resnik, supra note 114, at 247.
264 Schmitt, supra note 86, at 4.
265 Killian, supra note 84, at 15. This is crucial considering the fact that the majority
of non-violent drug offenders are in prison because of their unsuccessful battle with
addiction. Furthermore, national figures indicate that a chronic drug addict costs society
approximately $42,000 per year, making treatment options a necessity. Id.
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not only will the self-worth of the individual be ignited, but the process will
also be able to provide, as a practical matter, the appropriate diagnostic
assessment that corresponds with the nature of an individual's addiction.
The question then becomes, even with all these advantages, will the
offender still feel obligated to make a genuine effort towards recovery?
While no solution can make any guarantees, this one presents the best
chance. This is because mediation has the ability, through cooperation and
open discourse, to foster interpersonal relationships, where the parties
develop a genuine interest about the individual's success.266 Fostering
interpersonal and collaborative relationships will re-enforce a sense of
obligation and responsibility.267 Since mediation allows the criminal offender
to be part of the solution, it is much more likely that "they will find the result
acceptable." 268 This is most crucial here, since the individual's efforts are
dispositive of the endeavor's success in alleviating addiction. Since
mediation allows the individual to become active in the process, thereby
making the rehabilitative solution more acceptable to him, the chances of
success are thereby increased. In contrast, the criminal courts are decidedly
impersonal, where no effort is made to know the offender, and where the
offender never takes part in the solution. The ability of mediation to offer
more effective and responsive solutions (i.e., rehabilitation) is readily
apparent.
Many individuals would question such a program on two grounds. First,
critics may argue that it is overly idealistic and naYve to assume that an
addicted offender will candidly discuss their personal life, much less talk at
all. Even if they do communicate, it will be more likely than not that they
will lie or mask the truth, rather than be honest and forthcoming. The success
of the drug courts demonstrates that substantial progress is being made with
these offenders. 269 Furthermore, because of its informality and flexibility,
mediation will be less intimidating to the offender. Instead of being inhibited
from speaking, the individual may be more inclined to communicate because
of the informal nature of the proceeding. In describing the advantages of
ADR systems, Delgado explains, "[t]hose who feel threatened or intimidated
byformal courts may be willing to bring a problem to an informal forum."270
266 See supra text accompanying note 209.
267 See Levi, supra note 130, at 1171 (citing MCEWEN & MAIMAN, supra note 258,
at 60).
268 See Stipanowich, supra note 238, at 871 (citing McEwen & Maiman, supra note
260, at 238-39).269 See supra Part IV.C.
27 0Delgado et al., supra note 115, at 1366 (citing Derek Bok, Law & Its
Discontents: A Critical Look at Our Legal System, B. LEADER, Mar.-Apr. 1983, at 21)
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In a formal setting individuals may be less inclined to communicate, because
they may feel a sense of inequality among the lawyers and judges present.
But mediation's structure changes this perception, and with that, changes the
role of the offender into an active participant. Since an individual has already
pleaded guilty, candid statements will not be used against him in the present
offense.
The idea that an individual will engage in stratagems or deceptions is
without merit. It is fair to assume that by agreeing to plead guilty and enter
mediation, an individual voluntarily sought out the mediation forum instead
of facing a prison term, which evinces, on the offender's part, at least some
commitment to the mediation. It is in the offender's best interest to speak
candidly and make honest efforts, because failure in the rehabilitative efforts
may lead to sanctions, including a prison term. It seems illogical that an
offender would engage in deceptions, knowing that any failure on his part
would mark a return to the very system that, by pleading guilty, he sought to
avoid. Michael Flaherty, Vice President of St. Francis Center for Addiction,
explains, "[w]e found that having offenders under the threat of a worse
alternative really encourages motivation."271 Since it is in the individuals'
best interest to succeed in a program aimed at rehabilitation, the likelihood of
deception will be reduced. In essence, the contingency of the program
ensures that no individuals will "slip through the cracks" in the system.
Additionally, the voluntary nature of the mediation program gives more
credibility to those participants who actively choose, and are not compelled,
to enroll in the program.
Critics may assert that while cooperation and communication are
important values, they have no place in a system of resolving disputes.
Instead, the adversarial system is best suited to represent the individual's
interest and protect his rights. This argument would be more forceful but for
the fact that under this program there would not be any room for an
adversarial relationship. Since, as stated, the offender has pleaded guilty, the
adversarial nature of the relationship will be diminished, if not completely
extirpated. The prosecutor, in mediation, would not be trying to "convict" the
offender, because that part of the process ended before mediation began.
Instead, there will exist a comprehensive search for a solution that treats the
offender's addiction. Adversarial behavior would be a destructive, not
constructive, value to this undertaking.
(emphasis added). This highlights Delgado's argument that minority groups may be more
intimidated by a formal adjudicatory setting. As a result, the informal nature of ADR can
serve to enhance access for groups that would otherwise not seek redress. Id.
271 Schmitt, supra note 86, at4.
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Of course, an individual may decide to forego mediation and fight at
trial. This approach is invaluable in many settings. However, to those who
would advocate this approach in cases of crimes of addiction, it must be
noted that this approach will never solve the problem. It never delves into the
symptoms of addiction, and it never seeks to treat the substance abuse
problem, the very factor that led to the criminal behavior. In speaking of
rehabilitation, McDonough suggests, "[i]f you don't do that, what happens is
the average inmate gets out... and goes right back to the culture he came
from.., he is still an addict. '272 As a result, the real issues that are presented
in crimes of addiction cases -are masked. In such a situation, even if the
offender "gets off," he still comes out a loser because his problem is never
addressed. The community also loses because it is still at risk. Even if the
offender is convicted, short prison terms or probation are the retributivist
remedy, which further ignores the problem. With such a superficial approach,
the outcome of the trial will nonetheless represent a "lose/lose" proposition
for all parties. Hence, while the adversarial process is a valuable commodity
in some instances, it is specious and misguided in the case of crimes of
addiction.
The foregoing discussion reveals that mediation is the best choice for
crimes of addiction for two reasons. First, mediation can serve as an effective
means for resurrecting rehabilitative solutions, which clearly pose the best
chance to treat and eradicate the offender's addiction, thereby successfully
re-inculcating him back into society. Furthermore, mediation's informal
structure does not mandate uniform and impersonal solutions, but allows the
parties to engage each other in a meaningful, collaborative way. Channels of
communication are opened, cooperation is born, and through this, creative
solutions can be envisioned and personal relationships fostered. This
structure creates a strong possibility of successfully alleviating an offender's
addiction because of the feelings of personal responsibility and obligation
that mediation fosters. Mediation serves as an effective conduit for the
successful implementation of the rehabilitative ideal. Crimes of addiction
will be treated with an end (rehabilitation) that can eradicate addiction, and
implemented with a means (mediation) that can effectively impart the
rehabilitative ideal to those offenders who seek to treat their addiction.
Through mediation, we thus create solutions that have a real-and lasting-
chance to work. However, there are still concerns that must be addressed in
order to ensure the successful operation of this alternative program.
272 Killian, supra note 84, at 15.
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3. Mediation Decreases Dependence on Lawyers, Reducing the
Possibility for Opportunism and Self-Interest
Although mediation strives to foster a sense of active cooperation, it is
important to ensure that mutual cooperation does not denigrate into
opportunistic self-interest. This is possible when lawyers primarily focus on
"winning and losing" rather than searching for beneficial solutions, such as
rehabilitation. If lawyers focus on the "win/lose" nature of resolving
disputes, this can often ignite the self-interest of the parties, thereby
degrading the positive functions that allow mediation the chance to search for
novel and creative solutions. Resnik highlights this theme, explaining that
"[a]djudication is seen as a process that often brings out the worst in its
participants ... because it defines self-interest in such a fashion that requires
inflicting losses, rather than maximizing gains. '273 If such an approach is
adopted, the mediation process will become akin to the criminal process,
where the singular goal of "victory" will transcend what is truly beneficial to
the parties. This would signal a significant obstacle in the path of generating
a successful rehabilitative solution for crimes of addiction, and this approach
would frustrate attempts to work cooperatively and communicate openly.
Indeed, if lawyers become involved in an opportunistic manner, not only
would communication break down, but the adversarial nature of the
traditional criminal process will re-emerge, thereby destroying all the aspects
of cooperation that make mediation a more desirable form of dispute
resolution for crimes of addiction. As Levi explains in her article, "[1]awyers'
participation in mediation may be viewed as undesirable because lawyers
often obstruct nonstrategic communications ... in order to protect parties
against giving up [their] rights. ' 274 By obstructing communications, lawyers
run the risk that parties will once again become polarized and that the
processes of cooperation will break down. For this reason, "mediators view
the parties' [not the lawyers'] participation ... as important [in] moving
beyond purely adversarial negotiation .... -"275 These represent the primary
dangers facing mediation, because if self-interest and adversarial bargaining
contaminate the process, then the advantages that mediation claims to
possess, such as collaboration, mutual respect, and open communication, will
rapidly evaporate.
The informal structure of mediation effectively decreases the need for
lawyers to even be present, thereby diminishing the chance that lawyers will
273 Resnik, supra note 114, at 250 (emphasis added).
274 Levi, supra note 130, at 1169 n.15.
275 Id. at 1169 (emphasis added).
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be tempted to engage in self-interest at the expense of collaborative problem
solving. Mediation "levels the playing field" because it discards procedural
and substantive formalities that are often beyond the realm of common
knowledge. As a result, the offender will not need to depend on his lawyer to
resolve procedural complexities, make nebulous legal arguments, or
formulate intricate legal strategy. Resnik, suggests that these factors may
"lessen parties dependence on lawyers . . . ."276 The fact that an individual
has already pleaded guilty further decreases the need for an attorney, because
the mediation forum is almost exclusively remedial-driven.
Some critics may still argue that even if the individual has pleaded
guilty, it is crucial for a lawyer to be present to explain in detail the
ramifications of agreeing to any type of rehabilitation program. In essence,
the lawyer's presence is still needed to protect the client's rights. This
argument ignores the fact that this type of mediation will be court-sponsored,
giving the presiding court subsequent review over the proceedings in order to
ensure their fairness and even-handedness. The mediation will take place in
the shadow of court supervision, adding incentive to conduct proceedings in
a judicious manner. Furthermore, a lawyer is not always necessary to impart
legal advice. Pursuant to court authorization, mediators should have the
option of obtaining legal counselors for the individual. These can be neutral
observers who advise, the individual on certain aspects of the proceedings,
but who do not advocate. Since the proceeding is largely informal, and since
guilt has already been decided, the importance of this issue is virtually
nonexistent. If anything, the need for a lawyer is at the adjudicatory hearing,
where addicted offenders must choose whether to plead guilty and enter
mediation, or go to trial and face the possibility of prison. Since the
mediation takes places ex-post, the necessity for the lawyer is simply not
significant.
The fact that dependence on lawyers is diminished, coupled with
mediation's informality, will inherently foster a sense of access.2 77 Like the
drug courts, mediation's informality affords it the opportunity to rehabilitate
and treat individuals who would otherwise go untreated in the criminal
paradigm. 278 Individuals who are faced with adjudication aimed at mere
punishment may opt for a congenial, informal atmosphere that seeks to treat
their affliction instead of condemning its results.2 79 The creation of a forum
276 Resnik, supra note 114, at 247.
277 See Delgado et al., supra note 115, at 1366.
278 See supra text accompanying note 208.
279 It should be pointed out that in such a program, individuals would be forced to
plead guilty at the outset. This would serve the purpose of completely eliminating the
culpability phase of the hearing.
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that produces tangible, successful results would be an attractive alternative
for anyone with this affliction who has violated the law. A person who
believes in the strength and credibility of the legal system would probably be
more inclined to seek legal redress. Similarly, a person afflicted with a
substance abuse problem would be more likely to engage a system that he or
she believes will assist in curing their illness.
B. The Structure of Court-Sponsored Mediation will be
Cost-Efficient, Saving the State Significant Financial Resources
ADR can save the state a significant amount of money in two ways.
First, the informal nature of the process lends itself to a speedy and efficient
resolution of each case.280 The de-emphasis on procedural safeguards allows
for a rapid disposition of each case on the merits. The simplicity of the ADR
proceeding greatly enhances the efficacy with which cases are processed. 281
Since the individual will have to plead guilty before entering the ADR forum,
there will exist no burden on the state to provide representation. In addition,
jurors need not be impaneled, and support staff can be kept to a minimum.2 82
The ADR process will be more efficient than trial courts, where formal
procedures and protracted trials often exact a burden on state resources. 283
Furthermore since countless individuals are arrested for crimes of addiction
offenses each year, ADR can have a significant impact on cost-reduction
practices. 284
The rehabilitative disposition of ADR will also save money for the state.
As discussed above, it is less expensive to send an individual to treatment
than prison.285 This will alleviate the burden on some of our prisons, while
reforming first-time offenders who would otherwise likely re-cycle through
280 Delgado et al., supra note 115, at 1366. In ADR forums, jurors need not be
selected and educated, and informal forums do not require the same amount of personnel
that are required in the courts, such as clerks, bailiffs and court reporters. This way, ADR
can be cost-effective for the state. See id. (citing E. JOHNSON ET AL., OUTSIDE THE
COURTS 86 (1977)).
281 Id. ("ADR's informality often obviates the need for attorneys; in some cases
attorneys are barred. Even if attorneys are permitted, the brevity and simplicity of
informal proceedings greatly reduce the costs of representation.").
282 Id.
283 Id.
284 In New Jersey alone, 513,200 individuals were convicted of DWI offenses in
1997. Yost, supra note 82, at A12.
285 Try Drug Treatment, supra note 83, at D12. (stating that while it costs ninety
dollars a day to keep a drug offender in jail, it only costs forty-five through sixty dollars
to put them through drug treatment).
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the system, eventually ending up in prison.286 By reducing recidivism, ADR
can save the state a significant amount of capital. This will allow the criminal
courts to concentrate their attention on more violent and egregious felonies-
the crimes deserving retributivist responses. For these reasons, ADR exists as
a tenable alternative to the traditional trial structure.
VI. CONCLUSION
This Note strikes a careful balance between theoretical justifications and
practical efficacy. Most importantly, this Note highlights the role that ADR
can play in the criminal context, as a necessary means for a successful ends.
Without congruity of means and ends there is simply no possibility, no
matter how noble the theory, to experience true practical success. This was
exemplified by the courts' failure in adopting rehabilitation. Conversely,
ADR, by combining elements of informality with creativity, serves an
important role as a necessary means in solving a problem that has been
plagued by failures and repeated tragedies. Mediation is a forum where
rehabilitation can operate successfully. The desire to utilize rehabilitation in
an ADR forum represents an endeavor that places practicality ahead of
misguided morality, where true success is defined in terms of results, not
merely by what is "popular. '287 From this perspective, ADR plays a crucial
role in vindicating the societal interest because it serves to vindicate the
victim's interest.
While this inevitably involves a schism or categorization of certain
crimes into different forums, it is an endeavor well worth taking. With this
approach comes a realization that judicial responses must vary as the nuances
of criminal behavior vary. A system of uniform responses to criminal activity
ignores the fact that different crimes may, in some circumstances, call for
vastly different responses. If we adopt such an approach, we will be effective
in vindicating the societal interest in preserving the public welfare. To do
this, our system of justice, at least in some circumstances, must be forward-
looking. This is where rehabilitation fills an important void that the courts
have been unable to sustain in adjudicating crimes of addiction. Quite
simply, certain offenders require treatment, not punishment. As a conduit for
the rehabilitative approach, ADR can serve a useful function in reforming
certain offenders and restoring the sense of faith in our judicial system.
286 The process of using ADR would be best for first-time offenders, who would
otherwise repeat the same offense.
287 For example, "tough on crime" politicians may win votes for these views, but in
reality, they are of no use in these cases.
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